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THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE OF NON-ASSUMABLE/
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INTRODUCTION

A debtor's ability to assume (i.e., affirm) or reject (i.e., disavow) executory
contracts and unexpired leases in bankruptcy has long been recognized as one of the
primary and essential tools available to a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.' This
tool generally allows a debtor to keep favorable contracts (and compel continued
performance by the nondebtor parties to such contracts) and to discard burdensome
contracts (and avoid any future performance obligations under such contracts).2 In
fact, a debtor generally may assume and then assign an executory contract or
unexpired lease to a third party notwithstanding any provision in the contract or
lease, or in applicable law, "that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of
such contract or lease. 3 An assignment by a debtor under this section of the
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' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000) (the "Bankruptcy Code"). The Bankruptcy Code does not define the
term "executory contract;" however, the legislative history to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code suggests
that a contract is executory if" ... performance remains due to some extent on both sides" to the contract.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 58 (1978) ("Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory,
it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides."); H.R. REP.
No.

95-595,

at

347

(1977)

(noting

executory contract

" ... generally

includes ... [one in]

which

performance remains due to some extent on both sides."); see also Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy: Part!, 57 MrNN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973) ("[An executory contract is a] contract under which
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure
of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other."). Inaddition, some courts employ a "functional approach" to determine if a contract is executory for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. See cases cited infra note 22.
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000) ("[T]he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."); see also Eagle Ins. Co. & Newark Ins. Co. v.
BankVest Capital Corp. (In re BankVest Capital Corp.), 360 F.3d 291, 295 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Section 365
generally allows [a debtor] . .. to assume or reject [a contract] ... subject to the approval of the bankruptcy

court."); In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) ("One of the most important.
. tools available to a debtor is the right to either assume ... or to reject [a contract] ... pursuant to § 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.").
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f(1) (2000); see also In re Ames Dep't Stores, 287 B.R. 112, 118-19 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting " . . . debtors may assume and assign their interest in leases even without lessor
consent, and that notwithstanding any provisions in leases that prohibit, restrict, or condition the assignment
of those leases, they may nevertheless be assigned."); In re Office Prods. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R.992, 996-97
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (noting section 365(f)(1) generally permits a debtor to assume and assign
executory contracts notwithstanding any provision ... that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment
of such contract or lease ....
").
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Bankruptcy Code also does not require the consent of the nondebtor party to the
contract or lease.
In a perfect debtor's world, that would be the end of the story. There are,
however, a few "limited" exceptions to a debtor's general assumption and
assignment authority under the Bankruptcy Code.4 As a result of its more frequent
invocation in recent years by nondebtor parties (as well as its broader acceptance by
courts), at least one of these so-called limited exceptions has become far more
expansive. This exception, found in section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
provides that a trustee or debtor in possession may not assume or assign an
executory contract or unexpired lease if "applicable law excuses a party, other than
the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession whether
or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation
of duties." 5 The section 365(c)(1) exception often is called the "personal service
contracts" exception because courts initially limited the application of section
365(c)(1) to contracts and leases qualifying as personal service contracts under
applicable state law. 6 This is no longer the case. Courts are now adopting a far
more expansive approach to section 365(c)(1)-an approach often described as
covering "personal contracts and contracts of public importance. 7 Under this
broader approach, a wide array of contracts and leases have been excluded from a
debtor's general assignment (and, as discussed below, assumption) authority,
including personal service contracts (which can include contracts with corporations
as well as individuals), partnership agreements, intellectual property licenses,
government contracts, franchise agreements and limited liability company
agreements.
Once a contract is found to be within the scope of section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, a second issue arises as to whether section 365(c)(1) prevents the
debtor from assuming the contract for the benefit of the estate and the reorganized
debtor. 8 Indeed, numerous courts have determined that section 365(c)(1) not only

4See Texaco Inc. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 136 B.R. 658, 670-71 (M.D. La. 1992) (noting
Congress
intended section 365(c) to be narrow exception); Abney v. Fulton County (In re Fulton Air Serv., Inc.), 34
B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("[C]ourts have interpreted that an executory contract or an unexpired
lease is assignable under the general rule provided for in § 365(f) unless it falls under the narrow exception
provided in § 365(c).").

' See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2000).
6 See

cases cited infra note 65.

7 In re Headquarters Dodge Inc., No. 92-1030, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 25,

1992) (noting that some courts have applied section 365(c) to personal contracts and contracts of public
importance), rev'd sub nom., 13 F.3d 674 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Texaco, 136 B.R. at 670-71 (recognizing
exception applies to contracts of public importance).
8 Courts utilize two different approaches with respect to this issue under section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Under the "actual test," section 365(c)(1) applies only if the debtor actually seeks to
assign an executory contract or unexpired lease that cannot be assigned under applicable nonbankruptcy law.

In contrast, under the "hypothetical test," section 365(c)(1) prohibits the assumption of any executory
contract or unexpired lease when applicable law prohibits the assignment of the particular contract or lease,
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prevents the assignment of certain contracts, but also prevents the assumption and
performance of the contract by the debtor itself.9 Consequently, if a contract or
lease falls within the section 365(c)(1) exception, bankruptcy may end a debtor's
rights under that contract or lease. This harsh result may be avoided if the debtor
obtains the nondebtor contract party's consent to the assumption (or assignment) of
the contract or lease by the debtor. 10 In addition, because some courts have
determined that, notwithstanding the non-assumable nature of a contract or lease
under section 365(c)(1), the nondebtor party must first obtain relief from the
automatic stay imposed by section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code before
terminating the contract or lease, termination may be postponed." If, however, the
contract or lease at issue is an integral or valuable component of the debtor's
business, neither of these potential alternatives will likely provide comfort to a
potential debtor. On the other hand, nondebtor parties often view section 365(c)(1)
as one of the few protections provided to them under the Bankruptcy Code and are
increasingly utilizing this protection in the drafting and characterization of their
agreements with entities potentially facing financial distress.
Regardless of whether you are or represent a financially troubled entity or a
party dealing with a financially troubled entity, it is important to understand the
scope, application and consequences of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Such an understanding will allow a potential debtor to anticipate and prepare for
any section 365(c)(1) issues in its bankruptcy case and will help the nondebtor party
utilize the protections provided by this section. Accordingly, this article:
(A) provides a basic overview of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code; (B) examines2
the courts' application of section 365(c)(1) to personal service contracts, 14
partnership agreements, 3 intellectual property and technology licenses,
government contracts, " franchise agreements, 16 limited liability company
agreements and joint venture agreements; 17 (C) reviews the current split in the
courts regarding whether section 365(c)(1) prohibits only assignment or, rather,
assumption and assignment of protected contracts and leases; (D) examines the
rights of nondebtor parties to a contract or lease subject to section 365(c)(1); and
(E) provides some basic related practice tips for both potential debtors and
nondebtor parties in light of all of the foregoing.
even if no such assignment is actually contemplated. A more detailed discussion of these two tests can be
found in Section IV of the article.
9 See cases cited infra note 196.
'o See II U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B) (2000) ("The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor... [if] such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment ...
see also cases cited infra note 272.
" See cases cited infra note 240.
12See infra Section II.B. 1.
13See infra Section II.B.2.
14See infra Section II.B.3.
15See infra Section II.B.4.
16See infra Section II.B.5.
17See infra Section II.B.6.
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ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND
UNEXPIRED LEASES

A. General Overview ofAssumption
Section 365(a) of the Code sets forth the basic power of a trustee in bankruptcy
or a debtor in possession' 8 to assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease.1 9 Although section 365 does not define the term "executory contract," the
legislative history refers with approval to the following definition developed by
Professor Countryman: "[An executory contract is a] contract under which the
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing performance of the other., 20 Accordingly, under the
Countryman definition, section 365 applies to "contracts on which performance
18 In a chapter 11 case, a debtor in possession has the right to exercise the trustee's power to assume or
reject an executory contact or unexpired lease. In particular, section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides:
Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and to
such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have
all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and
powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in
sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this
chapter.
II U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000).

19 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 or this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."). The rejection of an executory contract or unexpired
lease constitutes a breach of such contract or lease immediately before the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2002) ("[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease[.J"). Accordingly, the nondebtor party to a
rejected contract becomes a general unsecured creditor and is permitted to seek allowance of its rejection
damages claim under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 502(g) provides:

A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this title or under a plan
under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, of an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be determined, and shall be allowed under
subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this
section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (2000).
20

S. REP. No. 95-989, at 58 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977); Countryman, supra note 1, at

460; see In re Kiwi Int'l Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.3d 311, 318 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Newcomb,
744 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Select-a-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980); Butler v.
Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R. 37, 42 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1999); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.02[l] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2003). Similar to the Countryman definition, the
legislative history to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code explains that the term "executory contract"
generally "includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." S. REP. No.
95-989, at 58 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977).
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remains due to some extent on both sides" prior to the bankruptcy filing. 2' In
contrast, many courts employ the "functional approach," under which a contract is
executory when the estate would benefit from the assumption or rejection of the
contract. 22 Using either analysis, courts have found that a wide variety of
contractual arrangements can constitute executory contracts under the Bankruptcy
Code, including, among others, partnership agreements,2 3 intellectual property and

21 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977). A contract that expires on its own terms pre-petition
is not
executory and cannot be assumed under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Moody v. Amoco Oil Co.,
734 F.2d 1200, 1212 (7th Cir. 1984) ("If a contract has been terminated pre-bankruptcy, there is nothing left
for the debtor to assume."); In re Pyramid Operating Auth., Inc., 144 B.R. 795, 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1992) ("It is well established that an agreement or contract which is validly terminated prepetition under
applicable state law is not assumable under section 365(a)."); In re Southold Dev. Corp., 134 B.R. 705, 710
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Contracts terminated prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition are not property of the
debtor's estate, and the court cannot resuscitate previously extinguished contract rights.").
22 Chattanooga Mem'l Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1978)
(criticizing rigid
application of above-quoted Countryman executory contract definition and proposing functional approach to
determining whether contracts are executory: "If those objectives [i.e., the purposes behind allowing a debtor
to assume or reject the contract] have already been accomplished, or if they can't be accomplished through
rejection, then the contract is not executory within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act."); see Sipes v. AtI.
Gulf Cmtys. Corp. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.), 84 F.3d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying functional
approach); Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Strouss Bldg. Assocs., 204 B.R. 948, 954-55 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (applying
functional approach); Laughlin v. Nickless, 190 B.R. 719, 723 (D. Mass. 1996) (same); In re Spectrum Info.
Techs., Inc., 190 B.R. 741, 747 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Several] courts have employed a result-oriented
approach which focuses upon whether or not the estate will benefit from the assumption or rejection of the
contract rather than fundamentally looking at mutuality of commitments."); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 146
B.R. 720, 729 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) ("[E]ven though there may be material obligations outstanding on
the part of only one of the parties to the contract, a contract may nevertheless be deemed executory under the
functional approach if its assumption or rejection will ultimately benefit the estate and its creditors."); Cohen
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 703
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The concept of the 'executory contract' in bankruptcy should be defined in light of
the purpose for which the trustee is given the option to assume or reject."); In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325, 327
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (applying functional approach); In re Bluman, 125 B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1991) (stating same); Camp v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Gov't Sec. Corp.), 101 B.R. 343, 349 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1989) ("In applying the functional approach, it is necessary to work backward, proceeding from an
examination of the goals rejection is expected to accomplish."), affd, 111 B.R. 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd,
972 F.2d 328 (1Ith Cir. 1992); In re Taylor, 91 B.R. 302, 311 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (applying functional
approach); Arrow Air Inc. v. Port Auth. (In re Arrow Air, Inc.), 60 B.R. 117, 122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)
("[E]ven though there may be material obligations outstanding on the part of only one of the parties to the
contract, a contract may nevertheless be deemed executory under the functional approach if its assumption or
rejection will ultimately benefit the estate and its creditors.").
" See Woskob v. Woskob (In re Woskob), 305 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing partnership
agreement as executory contract); In re O'Connor, 258 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2001) (assuming, without
discussion, partnership agreement was executory contract); In re Schick, 235 B.R. 318, 322 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating same); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 936 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994)
(assuming, without discussion, partnership agreement was executory contract); Breeden v. Catron (In re
Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 632 (E.D. Va. 1993) (characterizing partnership agreement as executory contract),
afJ'd, 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 446-50 (D. Md. 1992) (stating same),
afJ'd, 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 973 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(adopting parties' contention that partnership agreement was executory contract); In re Priestley, 93 B.R.
253, 258 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (finding limited partnership agreement was executory contract because
"substantial performance remained due from all parties to the contract."); In re Sunset Developers. 69 B.R.
710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) ("[T]he partnership agreement is an executory contract[.]"); Skeen v.
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technology licenses, 24 government contracts, 25 franchise agreements 26 and limited
Harms (In re Harms), 10 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) ("Applying the Tenth Circuit definition to
the limited partnership agreements ... the Court concludes that the agreements are executory.").
24 See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 264
(4th Cir. 2004)
(characterizing intellectual property licensing agreements as executory contracts); Perlman v. Catapult
Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating same); Everex Sys. v.
Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding license constitutes executory
contract because a license is "in essence, 'a mere waiver of the right to sue' the licensee for infringement.");
Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re Prize Frize, Inc.), 32 F.3d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding license of technology, patents and proprietary rights in certain machinery was executory
contract for purposes of section 365 of Bankruptcy Code because "there were obligations on both sides
which to some extent were unperformed."); Otto Preminger Films, Ltd. v. Qintex Entm't, Inc. (In re Qintex
Entm't, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1492, 1494-96 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding exclusive film license was executory contract
because licensor had continuing obligation not to license film to third parties and licensee had continuing
obligation to pay royalties); In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045 (characterizing
nonexclusive license to technical process as an executory contract); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290
B.R. 507, 511 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (characterizing exclusive licensing agreements as executory contracts);
In re BuildNet, Inc., No. 01-82293, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1851, at *8 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2002) ("As
a general rule, most patent, trademark, technology and other intellectual property licenses are executory
contracts."); In re Hernandez, 285 BR. 435, 438 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) ("The parties do not dispute the fact
that the [license agreement] is an executory contract .... ); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 135
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ("The Third Circuit follows the general rule that intellectual property licenses,
including copyright licenses, are executory contracts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) under the
Countryman test."); In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 308-09 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)
(characterizing intellectual property licenses as executory contracts); In re Access Beyond Techs. Inc., 237
B.R. 32, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (characterizing patent license agreement as executory contract); In re
Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Bankruptcy Courts have generally
treated nonexclusive copyright and patent licenses as executory contracts .... ); Univ. of Conn. Research &
Dev. Corp. v. Germain (In re Biopolymers, Inc.), 136 B.R. 28, 29-30 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (holding that
exclusive licensing agreement was executory contract because obligations remained outstanding on both
sides where licensor had to forebear from granting licenses to others and not to unreasonably withhold its
consent to licensee's sublicensing decisions); Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re
Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc.), 109 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (finding trademark license
agreement to be executory contract); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987)
(assuming, without discussion, patent license was executory contract); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 BR. 427,
430 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he [trademark] licenses in the instant case are executory as to both the
debtor and Farmland and, therefore, they are executory contracts within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §
365(a)."). But see In re Learning Publ'ns, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (finding
assignment of all rights in a book by the author to a publisher not an executory contract under the
Countryman definition); In re Stein & Day, Inc., 81 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
25 See In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 82-84 (3d Cir. 1988) (assuming, without discussion, that
contract
for manufacturing services with defense contractor was executory contract); In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R.
319, 322 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (assuming, without discussion, that contract for purchase of power with
unit of Department of Energy was executory contract); In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 858-59
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) (assuming, without discussion, that contract to provide telephone services to office
of federal government was executory contract); In re Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 164 B.R. 358, 359 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1994) (assuming, without discussion, that contracts to build vessels for United States Navy were
executory contracts); In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 BR. 496, 498-500 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993)
(assuming, without discussion, that military base operational support contract was executory contract); In re
Ontario Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(assuming, without discussion, that contract to remanufacture Navy locomotives was executory contract);
United States Dep't of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In re Carolina Parachute Corp.), 108 B.R. 100,
102 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (assuming, without discussion, that contract to manufacture parachutes for United
States Government was executory contract), affd in part, vacated in partsub nom., 907 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir.
1990); Pa. Peer Review Org., Inc. v. United States (In re Pa. Peer Review Org., Inc.), 50 B.R. 640, 645
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liability company agreements. 27
The purpose of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to "allow a debtor to
reject executory contracts in order to relieve the estate of burdensome obligations
while at the same time providing a means whereby a debtor can force others to
continue to do business with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise make
them reluctant to do so.",28 A debtor must assume an executory contract or
unexpired lease in its entirety and cannot assume only part of the contract or lease
or rewrite the terms of the contract or lease.29
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (assuming, without discussion, that contract to review health care services with
Department of Health and Human Resources was executory contract); Gov't Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana
Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 983 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)
(assuming, without discussion, that guarantee agreements with Government National Mortgage Association
were executory contracts).
26See City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534,
537 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (assuming, without discussion, that cable franchise agreement was executory contract);
In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1984) (assuming, without discussion, that franchise
agreement with Ford was executory contract); In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991) (assuming, without discussion, that franchise agreement with Burger King Restaurants was
executory contract); In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676, 677 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
(assuming, without discussion, that franchise agreement with Chrysler was executory contract); In re Van
Ness Auto Plaza, 120 B.R. 545, 546 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990) ("The parties agree that the franchise
agreement is an executory contract within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 365."); In re Bronx-Westchester Mack
Corp., 20 B.R. 139, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Both parties to the distributorship contract agree that it is
executory in nature and that the debtor's right to assume and assign it over the objections of Mack Trucks,
Inc. is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 365."); Varisco v. Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634, 639
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (concluding that "[Franchise] Agreement is still a viable and assumable executory
contract and may be assumed in the absence of adverse economic factors .... ").
27 See Northrop Grumman Technical Servs., Inc. v. Shaw Group Inc. (In re IT Group, Inc.), 302 B.R. 483,
487-89 (D. Del. 2003) (assuming, without discussing, that operating agreement governing limited liability
company was executory contract); Broyhill v. DeLuca (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 65, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996) ("[T]his court concludes that the operating agreement governing D & B Countryside [LLC] is an
executory contract, since the object of the agreement ... has not yet been accomplished and the parties have
on-going duties and responsibilities to bring the project to a successful conclusion."); In re Daugherty
Constr., Inc., 188 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) ("[T]he LLC Articles or Organization and the
Operating Agreement among the LLC members . .. constitute, on the facts of this case, executory contracts
which the debtor may attempt to assume under section 365 .... "); see also Milford Power Co., L.L.C. v.
PDC Milford Power L.L.C., No. Civ.A. 506-N, 2004 WL 2978293, at *11 n.28 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2004)
("Case law holding that LLC agreements are executory contracts is less abundant, however, the trend seems
to be that LLC agreements are being treated the same as partnership agreements in most cases."). But see In
re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 708-09 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that limited liability
company agreement was not executory contract under section 365 where agreement merely provided
structure for management of company).
28See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563-64 (1994) (stating central purpose of contract
assumption and rejection provisions is allowing debtor a fresh start); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co., Inc.
(In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting, in part, Richmond Leasing Co. v.
Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985)). Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines
property of the bankruptcy estate broadly to include most executory contracts and unexpired leases to which
the debtor is a party. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) ("The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or
303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located
and by whomever held ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case.").
29 See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984) (stating debtor must assume executory
contract "cum onere."); Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 119 (3d Cir. 2001) ("If the trustee meets
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If the debtor determines that the assumption of the executory contract or
unexpired lease in its entirety is advantageous to the estate, the debtor must still
obtain the court's approval before it can assume the agreement.30 Courts generally
evaluate a debtor's request for authority to assume an executory contract or
unexpired lease under the "business judgment" standard. 3' For the most part, courts
are reluctant to interfere with a debtor's decision under the business judgment
standard and, thus, generally grant authority to assume an executory contract or
the assumption requirements under § 365, it must assume the executory contract entirely."); Stewart Title
Guar. Co. v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 F.3d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) ("It is well established that
as a general proposition an executory contract must be assumed or rejected in its entirety.") (quotation
omitted); City of Covington v. Covington Landing Ltd. P'ship, 71 F.3d 1221, 1226 (6th Cir. 1995) ("When
the debtor assumes the lease or the contract under § 365, it must assume both the benefits and the burdens of
the contract."); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank., N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
often-repeated statement that the debtor must accept the contract as a whole means only that the debtor
cannot choose to accept the benefits of the contract and reject its burdens to the detriment of the other party
to the agreement."); Cajun Elec. Members Comm. v. Mabey (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc.),
230 B.R. 693, 710 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) ("An executory contract may not be assumed in part and rejected
in part."); In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 227 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("A debtor must assume
an executory contract cum onere ...."); In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[An
executory contract] may not be assumed in part and rejected in part."); Cottman Transmissions, Inc. v.
Holland Enters., Inc. (In re Holland Enters., Inc.), 25 B.R. 301, 303 (E.D.N.C. 1982) ("It is axiomatic that an
assumed contract under section 365 is accompanied by all its provisions and conditions."); In re Village
Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[W]hen the executory contract or lease is
assumed, it is said to be assumed cum onere."); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.02[l][b] (Lawrence P.
King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) ("An executory contract may not be assumed in part and rejected in
part.").
3011 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., In re Office Prods. of Am.,
Inc., 136 B.R. 675, 685-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) ("Pursuant to the express language of § 365(a), an
executory contract cannot be assumed without a formal motion and the court's approval."); Univ. Med. Ctr.
v. Sullivan, 122 B.R. 919, 927 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) ("Section 365 provides that the power to accept or
reject executory contracts is 'subject to court approval."').
I See, e.g., Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S at 523 (explaining business judgment test is traditional standard
by which to evaluate debtor's decision under section 365 of Bankruptcy Code (citing Group of Inst. Invs. v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 549-51 (1943) (explaining decision to assume
or reject lease is one of business judgment))); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that debtor's decision to
assume or reject executory contract under section 365 must be evaluated under business judgment standard);
see also Durkin v. Benedor Corp. (In re G.I. Indus., Inc.), 204 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"a bankruptcy court applies the business judgment rule to evaluate a trustee's rejection decision."); Four B.
Corp. v. Food Bam Stores, Inc. (In re Food Barn Stores, Inc.), 107 F.3d 558, 567 n.16 (8th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that "the court uses a business judgment test in deciding whether to approve a trustee's motion
to assume, reject, or assign an unexpired lease or executory contract."); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime
networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that "a bankruptcy
court reviewing a trustee's or debtor-in-possession's decision to assume or reject an executory contract
should examine [the] contract and the surrounding circumstances and apply its best 'business judgment' to
determine if it would be beneficial or burdensome to the estate to assume."); In re Market Square Inn, Inc.,
978 F.2d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he resolution of this issue of assumption or rejection will
be a matter of business judgment by the bankruptcy court."); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distr.
Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1989) (approving bankruptcy court's application of business judgment
test); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that business
judgment test is flexible test for determining when executory contract may be rejected).
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unexpired lease absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of discretion. 2
If a default exists under the executory contract or unexpired lease,
section 365(b) protects the nondebtor party by requiring the debtor to cure the
default, compensate the other party for any actual pecuniary loss caused by the
default and provide adequate assurance of future performance under the terms of the
contract or lease before the debtor can assume the executory contract or unexpired
lease.33 Nevertheless, pursuant to section 365(b)(2), a debtor does not have to cure
any default relating to (1) the debtor's insolvency or financial condition, (2) the
commencement of the bankruptcy case or (3) the appointment of a trustee, a
receiver or a custodian before the case, in order to assume an executory contract or
unexpired lease.3 4 Section 365(b)(2)(D) also provides that a debtor need not cure
any default relating to "the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a
default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations
under the executory contract or unexpired lease" in order to assume an executory
contract or unexpired lease.35
32 See, e.g., In re Richmond Metal Finishers,Inc., 756 F.2d at 1047 (explaining that, under business
judgment test, "courts should defer to-should not interfere with-decisions of corporate directors upon
matters entrusted to their business judgment except upon a finding of bad faith or gross abuse of their
'business discretion."'); see also In re Market Square Inn, 978 F.2d at 121 (explaining same); Sharon Steel,
872 F.2d at 39-40 (explaining same); In re S. Cal. Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 896-99 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987) (explaining same).
33 Section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor,
the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of the assumption
of such contract or lease, the trustee (A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such
default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2000).
34 Section 365(b)(2) provides:
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a
provision relating to (A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title;
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a
custodian before such commencement; or
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a default arising from
any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory
contract or unexpired lease.
Id. § 365(b)(2) (2000).
35 There is a split of authority as to whether section 365(b)(2)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code creates one or
two exceptions to the cure requirements in section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Compare Worthington
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B. General Overview ofAssignment
Section 365(f) of the Code permits a debtor to assume and assign an executory
contract or unexpired lease to a third party. 36 A debtor that wishes to assign an
executory contract or unexpired lease to a third party must first assume the contract
or lease in accordance with section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.37 The debtor
also must provide the nondebtor party to the contract or lease with adequate
assurance of future performance by the proposed assignee, even if there has been no
default under the contract or lease. 38 Adequate assurance of future performance by
the proposed assignee is an important protection for nondebtor contract parties
because, once the contract has been assumed by the debtor and assigned to a third
party, the debtor is no longer liable for a breach occurring after the assignment.39
v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., Inc.), 113 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that term "penalty" modifies both "rate" and "provision" thus creating one "exception concerning
those provisions of a contract which impose a penalty for a debtor's failure to perform a nonmonetary
obligation."); Beckett v. Coatesville Hous. Assocs., No. 00-5337, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9281, at *16-17
(E.D. Pa. July 5, 2001) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision to lift automatic stay where debtor's
nonmonetary default was material and, thus, could not be cured under section 365 of Bankruptcy Code); In
re Williams, 299 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (following Ninth Circuit's decision in Claremont
Acquisition Corp.); In re New Breed Realty Enters., 278 B.R. 314, 321 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating
same); In re Christopher Vitanza, No. 98-19611, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1497, at *75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
1998) (same), with Eagle Ins. Co. & Newark Ins. Co. v. BankVest Capital Corp. (In re BankVest Capital
Corp.), 360 F.3d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that section 365(b)(2)(D) frees debtor "from lease
provisions requiring the payment of penalty rates" and "non-monetary defaults."); In re GP Express Airlines,
Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 233-34 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997) ("[A] debtor is not required to cure or satisfy any penalty
rate obligation and the debtor is not required to cure any defaults in nonmonetary obligations."). Section 328
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, as recently passed by the Senate,
attempts to resolve this conflict by relaxing the cure requirement for certain nonmonetary defaults and by
striking "penalty rate or provision" and inserting "penalty rate or penalty provision" in section 325(b)(2)(D)
of the Bankruptcy Code. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
109th Cong. § 328 (2005) (enacted).
36 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (2000) ("Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a
provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits,
restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or
lease ...").
37 Id. § 365(f)(2)(A) ("The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only
if... the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the provisions of this section .... ); see
Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 120 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining before an executory contract may
be assigned, trustee must first assume the contract); In re Schick, 235 B.R. 318, 322-23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding trustee must first assume agreement pursuant to section 365(f)(2)(A) in order to assign it).
18 Id. § 365(f)(2)(B) ("The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only
if... adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease is provided,
whether or not there has been a default in such contract or lease."); see Cinicola, 248 F.3d at 120 (stating
"adequate assurance of future performance" of the contract must be provided); In re Fleming Cos., No. 0310945, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 198, at *3-*6 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 27, 2004) (finding debtor must first provide
adequate assurance of future performance before executory contract can be assigned and explaining
necessity of protection for the non-debtor party which assurance provides).
'9 Id. § 365(k) ("Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract or lease assumed under this section
relieves the trustee and the estate from any liability for any breach of such contract or lease occurring after
such assignment."); see also L.R.S.C. Co. v. Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc. (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 209
F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming adequate assurance is necessary to protect the non-debtor because
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Outside of bankruptcy, a debtor's ability to assign an executory contract or
unexpired lease may be prohibited, restricted or conditioned by a provision in the
agreement itself or by applicable nonbankruptcy law. Section 365(f)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, provides that a debtor may assume and assign an
executory contract or unexpired lease "notwithstanding a provision in [the]
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that
40
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease.
Accordingly, on its face, section 365(f) appears to permit a debtor to assume and
assign an executory contract or unexpired lease even if: (1) the contract or lease
includes a provision that prohibits, restricts or conditions the assignment of the
contract or lease; or (2) applicable law prohibits, restricts or conditions the
assignment of the contract or lease. 41 As discussed below, however, a debtor's
ability to assign an executory contract or unexpired lease under section 365(f) may
be limited by other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
C. General Overview of Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
In contrast to the language of section 365(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
section 365(c)(1) provides that, absent the nondebtor party's consent, a "trustee may
not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor ... if
applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the
debtor or debtor in possession ....

Accordingly, the

plain language

of

section 365(c)(1) appears to prohibit a debtor from assuming or assigning an
executory contract or unexpired lease if "applicable law" excuses the nondebtor
party from accepting performance from a new obligor.
Read broadly, section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code arguably renders
section 365(f)(1) superfluous in certain factual contexts. The assignment of an
executory contract or unexpired lease necessarily involves the substitution of a new
obligor and, thus, performance under the contract or lease by a party other than the
debtor or debtor in possession. Accordingly, sections 365(f) and 365(c)(1) are
brought into conflict when a debtor seeks to assume and assign an executory
assignment relieves the trustee and the estate from liability arising from a post-assignment breach); In re
Fleming Cos., 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 198 at *3-*6 (declaring assignment relieves the debtor and bankruptcy
estate
from liability for breaches arising after the assignment).
40
d. § 365(0(1).
41 Id. ("[N]otwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, or in
applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee
may assign such contract or lease."); see also In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 316
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (holding boilerplate non-assignment clause in a executory contract ineffective under
section 365(0(1)); cf Trak Auto Corp. v. W. Town Ctr. L.L.C. (In re Trak Auto Corp.), 367 F.3d 237, 242
(4th Cir. 2004) (discussing general provision in section 365(0(1) which prohibits enforcement in bankruptcy
of anti-assignment clauses in leases).
42 Id. § 365(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 365(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that an
executory contract or unexpired lease falling within the scope of section 365(c)(1)(A) may nonetheless be
assumed or assigned with the consent of the nondebtor contract party. See id. § 365(c)(1)(B).

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 197 2005

ABILAWREVIEW

[13:187

contract or unexpired lease and "applicable law" excuses a nondebtor party from
accepting performance from a new obligor.43 Because assumption is a prerequisite
to assignment, this conflict informs many courts' interpretation of section 365(c)(1)
when a debtor seeks only to assume an executory contract or unexpired lease under
section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 44

D. Reconciling Sections 365(c)(1) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code
Courts have adopted various approaches to reconcile sections 365(c)(1) and
365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. One court has found that sections 365(c)(1) and
365(f) simply cannot be reconciled and decided to ignore the phrase "applicable
law" in section 365(f). 45 Most courts, however, have resolved the apparent conflict
between sections 365(c)(1) and 365(f) by ascribing a different meaning to the
phrase "applicable law" appearing in each section.46 For example, the United States
43 Although the language of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code suggests a narrow exception to a
debtor's general assignment powers (i.e., where a party's rights or obligations are nondelegable under
applicable law), some courts read section 365(c)(1) to include any applicable law that prohibits, restricts or
conditions assignment. See discussion infra Section I.D.
44 See discussion infra Section II-A.
45 See Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 637 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("[W]hile § 365(c) explicitly
directs the court to consider whether 'applicable law' prohibits assignment, the language 'notwithstanding a
provision ... in applicable law, that prohibits . . . assignment' of § 365(f) just as explicitly directs the court to
ignore applicable law. The two clauses at the beginning of § 365(f) simply cannot be reconciled.").
See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266 ("[U]nder the
broad rule of § 365(f)(1), the 'applicable law' is the law prohibiting or restricting assignments as such;
whereas the 'applicable law' under § 365(c)(1) embraces 'legal excuses for refusing to render or accept
performance, regardless of the contract's status as 'assignable'....") (quotation omitted); Perlman v.
Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1999):

Subsection (f)(1) states the broad rule-a law that, as a general matter, 'prohibits,
restricts, or conditions the assignment' of executory contracts is trumped by the
provisions of subsection (f)(1). Subsection (c)(1), however, states a carefully crafted
exception to the broad rule-where applicable law does not merely recite a general ban
on assignment, but instead more specifically 'excuses a party ... from accepting
performance from or rendering performance to an entity' different from the one with
which the party originally contracted, the applicable law prevails over subsection (f)(1).
Id. (internal citation omitted); City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners,
L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 538 (1 1th Cir. 1994) ("Subsection (f) states that 'applicable law' prohibiting assignment
of an executory contract does not bar assignment of an executory contract by a trustee (or debtor in
possession). Thus, the 'applicable law' to which subsection (c) refers must mean 'applicable law' other than
general prohibition barring assignment."); Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d
689, 695 (6th Cir. 1992) ("While subsections (f) and (c) appear contradictory by referring to 'applicable law'
and commanding opposite results, a careful reading reveals that each subsection recognizes an 'applicable
law' of markedly different scope."); Murray v. Franke-Misal Techs. Group, LLC (In re Supernatural Foods),
268 B.R. 769, 777-80 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (discussing the differing approaches to defining the scope of
"applicable law" as referred to in sections 365(f)(1) and 365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Schick,
235 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The use of 'applicable law' in both provisions yields an
apparent inconsistency-section 365(f) seems to give what section 365(c) then takes away. The courts have
resolved this dilemma by ascribing different meanings to the phrase 'applicable law' appearing in each
subparagraph."); In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 590-91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998):
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has interpreted the phrase "applicable law" in
section 365(f) as applying only to state laws that enforce contract provisions that
prohibit, restrict or condition assignment, and the phrase "applicable law" in
section 365(c)(1) as applying to state laws that, on their own terms, prohibit, restrict
or condition assignment of a particular type of contract.47
In Pioneer Ford Sales,4 8 a bankrupt Ford dealership sought to assume and
assign its franchise agreement with the Ford Motor Company to Toyota Village,
another car dealership. The Ford Motor Company objected to the proposed
assignment and argued that the franchise agreement was non-transferable on its own
terms and that assignment was barred under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The bankruptcy court and the district court both ruled that section 365(c)(1)
was inapplicable because the franchise agreement was not a personal service
contract based on a special relationship. 49 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court and the
district court applied section 365(f)(1) and permitted the assignment of the franchise
agreement with Ford to Toyota Village.5 °
The First Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court and the district court and found
that the bankrupt Ford dealership could not assume and assign its franchise
agreement, pursuant to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 5l The First
[T]his court finds that § 365(f)(1) states the general rule that a trustee or debtor in
possession may assign an executory contract notwithstanding "applicable law" that
prohibits assignment, while § 365(c)(1)(A) represents an exception to that rule where
applicable law protects the right of the non-debtor contracting party to refuse to accept
from or render performance to an assignee, and does not apply to general prohibitions
on assignments.
Id.

47 See In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984):

As a matter of logic, however, we see no conflict, for (c)(1)(A) refers to state laws
that prohibit assignment 'whether or not' the contract is silent, while (f)(1) contains no
such limitation. Apparently (f)(1) includes state laws that prohibit assignment only
when the contract is not silent about assignment; that is to say, state laws that enforce
contract provisions prohibiting assignment.
Id.; see also In re Supernatural Foods, 268 B.R. at 777-79 (adopting First Circuit's interpretation of the
interplay between section 365(c)(1) and section 365 (f)(1)).
48 In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 26 B.R. 116, 118 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983).
49 Id. (refusing to apply section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code because the franchise agreements were
not personal service contracts based on a special relationship between the parties), affd, 30 B.R. 458, 462
(D.R.I. 1983) ("The Court finds that the Ford Franchise Agreement is not a 'personal' contract within the
meaning of Section 365(c)(1) .... [T]he Franchise Agreement was not based on 'special trust and
confidence and on a special relationship of the parties."'), rev'd, 729 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1984).
SOIn re PioneerFord Sales Inc., 26 B.R. at 118 ("It is clear from § 365(0(1) ... that an executory contract
may be assigned notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary either in applicable law or in the contract
itself-such as the prohibition on assignment contained in paragraph F of the Preamble of the Ford Sales and
Service Agreement ... "), affd, 30 B.R. at 461 n.3 (D.R.I. 1983) ("The Franchise Agreement may be
assigned by the trustee in bankruptcy notwithstanding the express prohibition against assignment.
11 U.S.C. § 365(0 provides .... ").
51See In re Pioneer FordSales, Inc., 729 F.2d at 31.
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Circuit found that not only did the franchise agreement restrict the assignment of
the dealership, but state law also restricted the assignment of the dealership
irrespective of the language contained in the franchise agreement itself.52 The state
law in question was thus "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 365(c)(1)
because it restricted the bankrupt automobile dealer from assigning its franchise
agreement as opposed to merely enforcing the provision in the franchise agreement
that restricted the bankrupt automobile dealer from assigning its franchise
agreement.13 The First Circuit expressly rejected the argument that section 365(c)(1)
is limited to personal service contracts.5 4 As such, the bankrupt Ford dealership
could not assign its franchise agreement to Toyota Village.
Other courts have rejected the First Circuit's construction but nonetheless have
attempted a similar method of resolving the apparent conflict between
sections 365(c)(1) and 365(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 55 For example, the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
interpreted the phrase "applicable law" in section 365(0(1) as applying to general
prohibitions against assignment, and the phrase "applicable law" in
section 365(c)(1) as applying to specific laws that excuse a contracting party from
rendering performance to, or accepting performance from, a third party.56 Under
52

Id. at 28:

The nonbankruptcy law to which both sides point us is contained in Rhode
Island's "Regulation of Business Practices Among Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,
Distributors and Dealers" Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-5.1-4(C)(7). It states that "No
dealer... shall have the right to... assign the franchise... without the consent of the
manufacturer, except that such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." ... The
statute's language ... indicates that it applies "whether or not" the franchise contract
itself restricts assignment.
Id.
53 Id. ("The statute by its terms, allows a manufacturer to veto an assignment where the veto is reasonable

but not otherwise. The statute's language also indicates that it applies 'whether or not' the franchise contract
itself restricts assignment.").
54 Id. at 29 ("The language of [§ 365(c)(1)] does not limit its effect to personal service contracts. It refers
generally to contracts that are not assignable under nonbankruptcy law.").
55 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2004)
(indicating court "must ask why 'applicable law' prohibits assignment" and holding "only applicable antiassignment law predicated on the rationale that the identity of the contracting party is material to the
agreement is resuscitated by § 365(c)(1)."); Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.),
165 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating broad rule of section 365 (f)(1) is trumped by section 365(c)(1));
City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners,L.P.) 27 F.3d 534, 538 (1 1th
Cir. 1994) (emphasizing section 365(t)(1) states general rule and section 365(c)(1) limits trustee's power of
assignment; reasoning "applicable law" as used in subsections (c) and (f) must refer to non-bankruptcy law);
Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 1992) (disagreeing with
First Circuit's interpretation in Pioneer Ford Sales because "[t]here is simply nothing in the language of
§ 365(o which supports the limitation read into it .... "); see also In re ANC Rental Corp., 278 B.R. 714,
721 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (requiring applicable law to "specifically state that the contracting party is
excused from accepting performance from a third party under circumstances" where identity is material or
public safety is at stake); In re Schick, 235 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (agreeing that Circuits
"ascribe[] different meanings to the phrase 'applicable law."').
16 See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 266:
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this construction, section 365(c)(1)
applies when the identity of the original
57
contracting party is material.
For example, in Magness, golfing members 58 of the Dayton Country Club filed
petitions under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee sought to assume
and assign, through a sale, the debtors' membership interests to members of the
Dayton Country Club who were on the waiting list to become golfing members or
to the general public, and the Dayton Country Club objected. The bankruptcy court
[Section] 365(f)(1) lays out the broad rule-"a law that, as a general matter,
'prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment' of executory contracts is trumped by
the provisions of subsection (f)(l)." . . Section 365(c)(1), in contrast, creates a carefully
crafted exception to the broad rule, under which "applicable law does not merely recite
a general ban on assignment, but instead more specifically 'excuses a party ...from
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity' different from the
one with which the party originally contracted ......
Id. (citations omitted); In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 752 (stating same); In re James Cable
Partners,L.P., 27 F.3d at 538 ("[T]he 'applicable law' to which subsection (c) refers must mean 'applicable
law' other than general prohibitions barring assignment ....A general prohibition against assignment does
not excuse the City from accepting performance from a third party within the meaning of § 365(c)(1)."); In
re Magness, 972 F.2d at 699 (Guy, J., concurring) ("[T]he two sections refer to completely different legal
concerns, with 365(f) covering 'applicable law' (and contractual clauses) prohibiting or restricting
assignments as such, and 365(c) embracing legal excuses for refusing to render or accept performance,
regardless of the contract's status as 'assignable' according to state law or its own terms.").
See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 266-67 ("[O]nly applicable anti-assignment law predicated on the
rationale that the identity of the contracting party is material to the agreement is resuscitated by
§ 365(c)(1)."); In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 752:
[Iln determining whether an "applicable law" stands or falls under § 365(f)(1), a
court must ask why the "applicable law" prohibits assignment ....Only if the law
prohibits assignment on the rationale that the identity of the contracting party is
material to the agreement will subsection (c)(1) rescue it.
Id.; In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 699-700 (Guy, J., concurring):
I turn instead to the longstanding Ohio rule which excuses a contracting party
from rendering performance to, or accepting performance from, a third person or entity
where the identity of the original contracting party was material. Such contracts are
considered non-assignable precisely because of this right of first refusal. In my view,
this recognition of the right to refuse is the very sort of 'applicable law' saved by section
365(c).
Id.; In re ANC Rental, 278 B.R. at 721 ("[T]he applicable law must specifically state that the contracting
party is excused from accepting performance from a third party under circumstances where it is clear from
the statute that the identity of the contracting party is crucial to the contract or public safety is at issue.").
58In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 691:
[M]embers of the club are entitled to play, eat, and socialize in all activities except
golf. If... a member desires to play golf.., he or she... [must pay] a substantial
fee ...[to be] placed on the waiting list ....When a vacancy occurs because of a
failure to pay dues or a resignation, the first person on the waiting list is given the
option to become a golfing member by paying an additional substantial fee.
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and the district court both found that the debtors' golfing memberships were not
assignable under section 365(c)(1). 59 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower courts and held that the debtors' golfing
memberships could not be assumed and assigned under section 365(c)(1).
The Sixth Circuit found that the phrase "applicable law" in section 365(c)(1)
applies to laws that excuse a contracting party from accepting performance from a
third party. 60 As discussed in the concurring opinion, under Ohio law, a contracting
party is excused "from rendering performance to, or acceptance performance from,
a third person or entity where the identity of the original contracting party [is]
material. '61 Further, the agreement between the Dayton Country Club and its
members was the type of contract that fell within the scope of Ohio law because the
identity of the member was material to the membership agreement. 62 Thus, the
Dayton Country Club would be excused from permitting a substitute member, or a
member that acquired his or her membership interest through assignment, to play
golf.63 Accordingly, Ohio law in this case was not a general prohibition against
assignment but a specific law governing restrictions on personal associations that
was applicable in bankruptcy under section 365(c)(1). 64
In sum, courts seeking to resolve the conflict between sections 365(c)(1)
and 365(0 of the Bankruptcy Code generally have given effect to section 365(c)(1)
when the assignment of the contract in question conflicts with a specific
nonbankruptcy law that would excuse the nondebtor party from accepting
performance under the contract from another person and the identity of the original
contracting party is material. This exception thus often is referred to as the
"personal service contracts" exception to section 365(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The universe of contracts to which section 365(c)(1) applies, however, has
expanded to include a wide array of contracts and leases that generally would not
'9 Id. at 693 ("The bankruptcy court[] found that the trustee was barred from assigning the full golf
memberships by Ohio law under § 365(c) ....The district court affirmed the order barring assignment of
Magness' full golf membership on the basis of the bankruptcy court's reasoning ....
").
60 See id. at 696 (applying section 365(c) to determine whether Ohio law excuses club from accepting

golfing member chosen by trustee); see also id. at 699 (Guy, J., concurring) ("[T]he two sections refer to
completely different legal concerns, with 365(f) covering 'applicable law' (and contractual clauses)
prohibiting or restricting assignments as such, and 365(c) embracing legal excuses for refusing to render or
accept performance, regardless of the contract's status as 'assignable' according to state law or its own
terms.").
61Id. at 699-700 (Guy, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 700 (Guy, J., concurring) ("Given that the club is a voluntary association, the identity of its
members is surely 'material' to the membership agreements. The club's objection to the proposed assignment
is the resulting interference with its ability to confer the full golf privileges on those members by the method

of its choice.").

63 Id. at 699-700 (Guy, J., concurring) (stating that golf club memberships "create personal relationships
among individuals who play golf together. They are personal contracts and Ohio law does not permit the
assignment of personal contracts.").
64 In his concurring opinion, Judge Guy expressly rejected the argument that section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code is limited to personal service contracts. Id. at 699 ("One court has limited [§ 365(c)] to
rules regarding 'contracts for the performance of nondelegable duties ....This case ... is clearly in error
since section 365(c) governs not only delegation of duties but also assignment of rights.").
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qualify as "personal service" contracts under state law.
II.

THE EXPANDING APPLICATION OF SECTION 365(c)(1) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE

A.

General Overview

Some of the first courts to address the conflict between sections 365(c)(1)
and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code found that section 365(c)(1) applies only to
personal service contracts. 65 At common law, the contractual duties of an individual
to perform personal
services generally were regarded as inherently nondelegable or
nonassignable.66 For example, if a famous opera singer contracted with an opera
61 In re Raby, 139 BR. 833, 835-36 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) ("[Section 365(c)] incorporates the doctrine
of non-delegable duties."); In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
("Section 365(c)(l) was designed only to prevent a Debtor-In-Possession from assigning unexpired
executory contracts including personal service contracts, which are ordinarily not assignable by law."); In re
Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) ("This Court has
previously held that franchise agreements are not personal service contracts, and thus are assignable.");
Abney v. Fulton County (In re Fulton Air Serv. Inc.), 34 B.R. 568, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The Court
agrees with the majority point of view that.., subsection (c) must be limited to executory contracts and
unexpired leases in which applicable law excuses acceptance of performance such as nondelegable personal
service contracts."); In re Haffner's 5 Cent to $1.00 Stores, Inc., 26 BR. 948, 950 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983)
("[S]ection (c)(1)(A) is generally understood to refer to contracts for nondelegable personal services, and not
to leases for the occupancy of real property."); In re Pioneer Ford Sales Inc., 26 B.R. 116, 118 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1983) ("(Section 365(c)(1)], which is specifically excepted from the provisions of § 365(f)(1), clearly
pertains to 'executory contracts that are personal in nature."'); In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 20 B.R.
139, 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[Section 365(c)(1)] relates to executory contracts that are personal in
nature. A distributorship or franchise agreement which does not depend upon a special relationship between
the parties is not within the reach of this exception."); In re U.L. Radio Corp., 19 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Such 'nondelegable' and, therefore, non-assumable contracts and leases include those for
unique personal services, as well as those to extend credit, to make loans, and to issue securities."); In re
Boogaart of Fla. Inc., 17 B.R. 480, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) ("[Section] 365(c)'s exception to § 365(f)
applies only to personal service contracts or contracts based upon personal trust or confidence."); Varisco v.
Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 BR. 634, 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[Section 365(c)(1)'s]
application is limited to executory contracts which are truly personal and this is not really the type of
contract involved here [because the franchise agreement was not based upon a special relationship]."); In re
Taylor Mfg., Inc., 6 B.R. 370, 372 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) ("The Court finds that the exception to the
general rule of the assignability of contracts was intended by Congress to be applied narrowly and to such
circumstances as contracts for the performance of nondelegable duties.").
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1981) ("Delegation of performance is a
normal and
permissible incident of many types of contract .... The principal exceptions relate to contracts for personal
services and to contracts for the exercise of personal skill or discretion."); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.06[1][b] at 365-58 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) ("Under the common law, the
duties under a contract to perform personal services could not be assigned."); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
11.10 at 744 (3d ed. 1999) ("One of the most significant [circumstances in which performance is
nondelegable] is the extent to which the performance is 'personal,' in the sense that the recipient must rely on
qualities such as the character, reputation, taste, skill, or discretion of the party that is to render it.");
CHARLES KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 875 (4th ed. 1999) ("Where a contract imposes on
an individual the duty of personal service, that duty is almost always regarded as inherently undelegable,
unless the other party assents."); see U.C.C § 2-210, cmt. (1977) ("The principal exceptions relate to
contracts for personal services and to contracts for the exercise of personal skill or discretion.").
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company to perform in an opera, the singer could not assign her contractual duty to
perform to another singer because the nature of those services is unique and
personal.67 Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code originally was thought to give
effect to this common law restriction in bankruptcy-i.e., the opera singer could not
assign her contractual duties even if she filed a bankruptcy case. Indeed, the
legislative history behind section 365(c)(1) refers to duties that are "nondelegable"
68
under applicable nonbankruptcy law as not being assignable in bankruptcy.
The position that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is limited to
personal service contracts, however, has since been rejected by several appellate
courts. 6 9 According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
although the impetus for Congress' enactment of section 365(c)(1) may have been
to preserve the common law rule precluding the assignment of personal service
contracts, the language of section 365(c)(1) "codifie[s] a much broader principle.
Surely if Congress had intended to limit [section] 365(c) specifically to personal
service contracts, its members could have conceived of a more precise term than
67 See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 illus. 6 (1981) ("A contracts with B, a corporation,

to sing three songs over the radio as part of an advertisement of B's product. A's performance is not
delegable unless B assents."); FARNSWORTH § 11.10 at 744-45 ("[A]n artist who contracts to paint a portrait
or a singer who contracts to sing in an opera cannot delegate performance, even though the delegate's
performance might be superior to that of the delegating party."); see also Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240, 248
(1866) (stating in dictum "All painters do not paint portraits like Sir Joshua Reynolds, nor landscapes like
Claude Lorraine [sic], nor do all writers write dramas like Shakespeare or fiction like Dickens. Rare genius
and extraordinary skill are not transferable, and contracts for their employment are therefore personal, and
cannot be assigned.").
68 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 199 (1973) ("[E]xecutory contracts requiring the debtor to perform
duties
nondelegable under applicable nonbankruptcy law should not be subject to assumption against the interest of
the nondebtor party.") (emphasis added); see In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B. R. 964, 978-80 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) (analyzing legislative history of section 365(c)(1)).
69 See Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 699 (6th Cir. 1992)
(Guy, J.,
concurring ) ("One court has limited [section 365(c)] to rules regarding 'contracts for the performance of
nondelegable duties ....This case ...is clearly in error since section 365(c) governs not only delegation of
duties but also assignment of rights."); Metro. Airports Comm'n. v. N.W. Airlines, Inc. (In re Midway
Airlines, Inc.), 6 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Since the statutory language does not limit the applicability
of § 365(c) exclusively to 'personal service contracts,' we agree with those circuits holding that it need not be
so constrained."); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) ("This provision limiting assumption
of contracts is applicable to any contract subject to a legal prohibition against assignment."); In re Pioneer
Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984) ("The language of [section 365(c)(1)] does not limit its
effect to personal service contracts. It refers generally to contracts that are not assignable under
nonbankruptcy law."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.),
700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Surely if Congress had intended to limit § 365(c) specifically to personal
service contracts, its members could have conceived of a more precise term than 'applicable law' to convey
that meaning."); see also Murray v. Franke-Misal Techs. Group, L.L.C. (In re Supernatural Foods), 268 B.R.
769, 777 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) ("Following Braniff, a number of courts recognized that the reference
within § 365(c)(1)(A) to 'applicable law' is more expansive than merely a veiled reference to 'applicable law'
regarding only personal service contracts."); In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1998) ("The circuit courts which have considered whether § 365(c) is limited solely to personal service
contracts, have found that § 365(c) was not written so narrowly by the drafters as to put such a drastic
limitation on its scope."); In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Appellee's contention
that 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) applies only to personal service contracts, though having some support in case law,
is essentially incorrect.").
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'applicable law' to convey that meaning."7 ° For this reason, courts have found
section 365(c)(1) to apply to contracts beyond those generally classified as personal
service contracts. 7'
B. Types of Contracts Generally Covered by Section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code
1. Personal Service Contracts
As a general rule, under state law, contracts for personal services are not
assignable outside of bankruptcy. 72 A personal service contract is a contract under
which the parties' respective duties are "so unique" that the obligee under the
contract has a "substantial interest" in having the original obligor perform,

70 In re BraniffAirways,
71

700 F.2d at 943.
Indeed, given the predilection for plain language arguments announced by the Supreme Court after

BraniffAirways, it is highly unlikely that a court would explicitly limit section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code to personal service contracts. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) ("It is well
established that 'when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms."'); Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) ("[W]hen the statute's language is plain,
the sole function of the courts'-at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to
enforce it according to its terms.") (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, as with all statutes, must begin
"with the language of the statute itself.").
72 See, e.g., Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957)
("[T]he duties imposed
upon one party may be of such a personal nature that their performance by someone else would in effect
deprive the other party of that for which he bargained. The duties in such a situation cannot be delegated.");
Rossetti v. City of New Britain, 303 A.2d 714, 718-19 (Conn. 1972) ("[l]t is indeed the general rule that
contracts for personal services cannot be assigned."); Menenberg v. Carl R. Sams Realty Co., 59 N.W.2d
125, 127 (Mich. 1953) ("Ordinarily, the execution of an agency for the sale of land involves the performance
of services that are personal in the sense that they are neither delegable nor assignable."); Sympson v.
Rogers, 406 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Mo. 1966) ("[Ain executory contract for personal services which involves
special knowledge, skill or a relation of personal confidence, may not be assigned without the consent of
both parties."); Paige v. Faure, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (N.Y. 1920) ("The general rule is that rights arising of a
contract cannot be transferred if they are coupled with liabilities or if they involve a relationship of personal
credit and confidence."); Saxe v. Feinstein, 77 A.2d 419, 421 (Pa. 1951) ("While a party to a contract may
assign his rights and benefits thereunder, he may not, unless the contract so provides, assign his liability
under the contract to perform duties involving his personal ability, integrity, credit or responsibility."); Scott
v. Fox Bros. Enters., Inc., 667 P.2d 773, 774 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Generally, absent an express provision
to the contrary, executory contracts are assignable unless they involve a matter of personal trust or
confidence or are for personal services."); Schweiger v. Hoch, 223 So.2d 557, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
("Florida is committed to the general law that contracts for personal services, or those involving a
relationship of personal confidence, are not assignable by either party unless the contract so provides, or
unless the other party consents thereto or ratifies the assignment."); Martin v. City of O'Fallon, 670 N.E.2d
1238, 1241 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996) ("Where the personal qualities of either party are material to the contract, the
contract is not assignable without the assent of both parties."); Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Prods. Co., 52
N.E.2d 651, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) ("An executory contract for personal services, to be paid for as
performed, cannot be assigned by the employer, unless the employee assents to the substitution of the
assignee as employer."); S. Cmty. Gas Co. v. Houston Natural Gas, 197 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Tex. App. 1946)
("A contract establishing a personal relationship between the parties is not assignable.").
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rendering the contract nondelegable.73
In other words, personal service contracts (including those that are based on a
relationship of personal confidence and trust) are contracts under which the parties
rely on "qualities such as the character, reputation, skill, or discretion of the party
that is to render" performance.74 For example, courts have characterized the
following types of agreements as personal service contracts: (a) an agreement to
render professional services as a physician, lawyer or architect; (b) an option to
purchase stock given to an employee; and (c) an agency agreement for the sale of
land.75 A contract may be "personal" to a corporate entity, as well as to an
individual.7 6
As previously stated, some of the first courts to address the conflict between
sections 365(c)(1) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code found that section 365(c)(1)
applies only to personal service contracts. 77 By narrowing the scope of
section 365(c)(1) to personal service contracts, these courts avoided the application
of section 365(c)(1) to most types of executory contracts and unexpired leases,
thereby permitting a debtor to assume or assign such contracts and leases.7 8
73In re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1011 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing personal

service contracts as demarcated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). See generally Sally Beauty Co. v.
Nexxus Prod. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that within personal service contracts is

the implicit expectation that the original party will perform the contract, making such contracts per se
nondelegable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (2) (1981) (defining nondelegable duties as
agreements that require performance by particular individual).
4See In re Midway Airlines, 6 F.3d at 495 ("The paradignatic example of [a personal service contract is] a
contract entered into on the basis of 'the character, reputation, taste, skill or discretion of the party that is to
render [performance].'"); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.10 at 744 (3d ed. 1999) (stating "personal"
contracts are those which "the recipient must rely on qualities such as the character, reputation, taste, skill, or
discretion of the party that is to render [performance].").
75See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 30 (2004) (identifying types of agreements courts have found to be
personal service contracts).

76 See Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding contract
was
personal to corporate debtor; the pertinent "inquiry is into the nature of the contract itself, to determine if it
calls for the exercise of some personal skill and judgment on the part of the bankrupt, or rests upon the other
party's placing trust and confidence in the reputation of the bankrupt for skill and integrity."); In re Rooster,
Inc., 100 B.R. 228, 233 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("Certain employment contracts of individuals also create a
categorical 'personal services' exception ....
Corporations can also, however, enter into such contracts."); In
re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The nonassignability
imprint of personal service contracts is firmly established New York law ....
The general rule has been
extended to encompass contracts with corporations as well as individuals.").
77See cases cited supra note 65; see, e.g., In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991) (finding section 365(c)(1) was designed to apply only to personal service contracts); In re Terrace
Apartments, Ltd., 107 B.R. 382, 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (upholding authorities that limit section 365(c)
to personal service contracts); Abney v. Fulton County (In re Fulton Air Serv., Inc.), 34 B.R. 568, 572
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("[S]ubsection (c) must be limited to executory contracts ... such as nondelegable
personal service contracts.").
78See, e.g., In re Raby, 139 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (granting trustee's assumption of land
installment contract); In re Sunrise Rests. Inc., 135 B.R. at 154 (granting debtor's motion to assume and
assign franchise agreement); In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991) (granting debtor's motion to assume franchise agreement); In re Haffner's 5 Cent to $1.00 Stores,
Inc., 26 B.R. 948, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (granting trustee's motion to assume and assign leases for
occupancy of real property); In re Pioneer Ford Sales Inc., 26 BR. 116, 119 (Bankr. DR.I. 1983) (granting
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2.

Partnership Agreements

As discussed above, courts have found partnership agreements to be executory
contracts. 79 Accordingly, the assumption or assignment of a partnership agreement
or the debtor's interest in a partnership is governed by section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code. This has important implications for debtors that are members of
partnerships because the ability of partners to assign their partnership interests often
is restricted by state law.
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 and the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914
(collectively, the "Uniform Partnership Acts") both provide that a person can80
become a partner only with the consent of all of the existing partners.
Additionally, the Uniform Partnership Acts both provide that a partner's only
transferable interest in the partnership is the partner's share of the partnership's
profits and losses and the partner's right to receive distributions .8 A transferee of a
partner's transferable interest has the right to receive distributions of the
partnership's profits; however, a transferee does not become a partner by virtue of
the assignment' or sale of the partner's transferable interest and has no right to
participate in the management of the partnership. 2 In this respect, the Uniform
debtor's motion to assume and assign franchise agreement); In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 20 B.R.
139, 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing debtor to assume and assign franchise agreement); In re U.L.
Radio Corp., 19 B.R. 537, 545 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting debtor's motion to assume and assign its
leasehold interest); In re Boogaart of Fla., Inc., 17 BR. 480, 486 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (granting debtor's
motion to assume and assign certain real property and equipment leases); In re Taylor Mfg., Inc. 6 B.R. 370,
372 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (granting trustee's motion to assume and assign real property lease).
79 See cases cited supra note 23.
go Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 401(i) (1997) ("A person may become a partner only with the consent of
all of the partners."), and CAL. CORP. CODE § 16401(i) (West 2004) (same), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
15-401(i) (2004), and 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/401(i) (2004) (same), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1A-21(i)
(West 2004) (same), and VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.106 (Michie 2004) (same), with UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 18(g) (1914) ("No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the
partners."), and N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40(7) (McKinney 2004) (same), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1775.17(G) (Anderson 2004) (same).
81Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 502 (1997) ("The only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership
is the partner's share of the profits and losses of the partnership and the partner's right to receive
distributions. The interest is personal property."), and CAL. CORP. CODE § 16502 (same), and 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 206/502 (same), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1A-28 (same), and VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.106
(same), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 26 (1914) ("A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits
and surplus, and the same is personal property."), and N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 52 (same), and OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1775.25 (same). The comparable provision under Delaware law provides: "A partnership
interest is personal property. Only a partner's economic interest may be transferred." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6
§ 15-502 (2004).
82 Compare UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 503(a)(3) (1997) ("A transfer, in whole or in part, of a partner's
transferable interest in the partnership ... does not, as against the other partners or the partnership, entitle
the transferee, during the continuance of the partnership, to participate in the management or conduct of the
partnership business, to require access to information concerning partnership transactions, or to inspect or
copy the partnership books or records."), and CAL. CORP. CODE § 16503(a)(2) (same), and DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6 § 15-503(a)(3) (same), and 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/503 (same), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1A29(a)(3) (same), and VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.107(A)(3) (same), with UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 27(1) (1914):
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not... as against
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Partnership Acts restrict the assignment of a partner's full or entire partnership
interest.
Invoking section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts have given effect to
the restrictions imposed by the Uniform Partnership Acts, as codified in full or in
part in various states, on the attempted transfer or assignment of a partnership
interest in bankruptcy. 83 For example, a court that decided (or was required) to
follow the First Circuit's reasoning in PioneerFord Sales most likely would enforce
such restrictions because the Uniform Partnership Acts restrict the assignment of
partnership interests irrespective of any language contained in the partnership
agreement. 84 Courts that consider whether the identity of the contracting party is
material to the agreement have enforced such restrictions because the identity of the
the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee, during the
continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership
transactions, or to inspect the partnership books[.]
Id.; and N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 53(1) (same), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.26(A) (same); see also
59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership§ 322 (2003):
The assignment of a partner's profit rights to a third party, without the consent to
his or her admission as a partner, does not make the third party a partner but merely an
assignee entitled to receive profits under his or her contract with the assignor in the sum
to which the assignor would have been entitled.
Id.
83 See Stumpf v. McGee (In re O'Connor), 258 F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he district court
correctly held the [partnership] agreement was not assumable under § 365(c)(1)."); In re Schick, 235 B.R.
318, 325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding section 365(c)(1) prevents assignment of partnership interest
unless other parties agree to admit assignee as substitute limited partner); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny),
175 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating partnership interest would not be assignable "to a
separate third party" under section 365(c)(1)); Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 635 (E.D. Va.
1993) ("[T]he court concludes, based on the facts and applicable law, that this Partnership Agreement is the
type of contract that cannot be assumed under § 365(c)(1)(A), absent the consent of the nondebtor
parties .... "); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. 443, 448 (D. Md. 1992) (stating whether section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits assignment of partnership interest depends "upon the materiality of the identity
of the partners to the performance of the obligations remaining to be performed under the partnership in
question."); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (stating that limited
partnership agreement was not assignable under section 365(c)(1)); In re Priestley, 93 B.R. 253, 260 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1988) (finding that debtor's rights to manage partnership were nonassignable under section
365(c)(1)); In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) ("Section 365(c) prevents the
Debtor-in-Possession from assuming or assigning the partnership other than such assignment as allowed by
the Idaho Uniform Partnership Law."); Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 B.R. 817, 821-22 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1981) (finding section 365(c)(1) prevented trustee from assuming position of general partner); cf, In re
Woskob, 305 F.3d at 187 ("Subsections 365(c) and 365(e) will prevent a debtor in bankruptcy from
continuing to serve as a partner, however, only when a non-debtor partner does not consent to continue in
the partnership with the debtor."); see also Broyhill v. DeLuca (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 65, 78 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1996) (finding debtors' bankruptcy filing effectively terminated their membership in limited liability
company).
84 See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting "hypothetical
test" but finding Massachusetts limited partnership statute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section
365(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code); see also supra note 47.
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partner generally is considered material to the underlying partnership agreement. 85
Along these lines, the bankruptcy court in Schick, following the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits' interpretations of section 365(c)(1), considered whether the debtors could
assign their interests as limited partners 86 in a partnership to a corporation. 87 The
partnership agreement prohibited the assignment of any partnership interest without
both the consent of the general partner and a certain percentage of the limited
partners.88 Under the applicable state partnership law, i.e., New York partnership
law, a partnership interest is assignable, but the assignee is only entitled to receive
distributions and allocations of profits and losses and does not become a member in
the partnership absent the consent of the other partners.89
The bankruptcy court found section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
applicable because New York partnership law was premised on the principle of
delectus personarum: "[A]t the heart of the partnership contract is the principle that
partners may choose with whom they wish to be associated." 90 According to the
85See, e.g., In re Catron, 158 B.R. at 635 ("Because a partner must accept performance from and render
performance to only his/her fellow partners, and.., is conditioned on the consent of the partnership's current
partners, the court concludes that . . . the nondebtor parties [are excused] ...from accepting performance
from or rendering performance to a party other than Catron."); In re Antonelli, 148 B.R. at 448 (stating
whether section 365(c)(1) prohibits assignment of partnership interest depends "upon the materiality of the
identity of the partners to the performance of the obligations remaining to be performed under the
partnership in question."); In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 324 ("The statutory proscription barring non-consensual
assignments of membership in the partnership is based upon the principle of delectus personarum (or
delectus personae),the choice of person."); see also cases cited supra note 65.
86See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 701 (2001) (containing substantially similar restrictions on assignment as
do Uniform Partnership Acts); id. § 702(a)(3) (2001)("A transfer, in whole or in part, of a partner's
transferable interest . . . does not, as against the other partners or the limited partnership, entitle the
transferee to participate in the management or conduct of the limited partnership's activities .... ).
87See In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 325 (following Sixth Circuit's and Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section
365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in finding section 365(c)(1) applicable to partnership agreement).
88Id. at 321-22. The partnership agreement provided:
[A] Partner shall not assign. .. his interest in the Partnership or any part thereof,
without both (a) the consent of the General Partner which consent may be granted or
withheld in the absolute discretion of the General Partner and (b) the consent of
partners holding, in the aggregate, sixty (60%) percent in interest of all partnership
interest. Any actual attempt at assignment ... without such consents shall be void and
shall not bind the parties.
Id.
89Id. at 323-24 ("[A] partnership interest is assignable ....

An assignment does not, however, entitle the

assignee to become or to exercise the rights of a partner .... Rather, it only entitles the assignee to receive
distributions and allocations of profits and losses.").
9 In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 324 ("The statutory proscription barring non-consensual assignments of
membership in the partnership is based upon the principle of delectus personarum (or delectus personae),
the choice of person. 'At the heart of the partnership concept is the principle that partners may choose with
whom they wish to be associated."' (internal citation omitted)); see also In re Nizny, 175 B.R. at 937 ("The
partnership agreement creates a fiduciary relationship among the partners .... A partnership agreement is a
contract based on personal trust and confidence, which cannot be assigned or assumed without consent of the
parties."); In re Catron, 158 B.R. at 627 ("Fundamentally a partnership is based upon the personal trust and
confidence of the partners."); In re Manor Place Dev. Assocs., 144 B.R. 679, 686 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) ("[A]
partnership agreement is a contract based upon personal trust and confidence."); In re Sovereign Group, 88
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bankruptcy court, "[t]he assignment of economic rights does not violate the
principle of delectus personarum, 'but it would be violated by the admission of a
new speaking and voting member into the closely knit arrangement that typifies the
general partnership."' 91 Thus, under New York law, the identity of the partner was
material to the partnership agreement. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court found
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code applicable and refused to authorize the
assignment of the estates' status as limited partners.92
3. Intellectual Property and Technology Licenses
Because courts have found that intellectual property and technology licenses are
executory contracts, the assumption or assignment of these licenses also is governed
by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.93 This has important implications for
debtors that hold intellectual property and technology licenses because federal
common law generally restricts the ability of licensees to transfer or assign their
licenses outside of bankruptcy.
a.

PatentLicenses

Under the Patent Act, a party that "invents or discovers a new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
A party that obtains a patent has,
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent ....
among other things, the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering
to sell or importing the patented invention within the United States 95 for a period of
20 years from the date of filing. 96 If a party makes, uses, sells, offers to sell or
B.R. 325, 329 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) ("[A Partnership] agreement among partners is unique in law because
it is not only a legal relationship that is created, but it reflects a personal relation or status somewhat akin to
the relationship of individuals in a marriage."); In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho)
("A partnership agreement is a contract based on personal trust and confidence, which cannot be assigned or
assumed without consent of the parties."); Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1981) ("A partnership agreement creates a fiduciary relationship among the members of the partnership. It is
a contract based upon personal trust and confidence."); Kellis v. Ring, 155 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) ("Personality is the very essence of a general partnership and although not as inherently pervasive in a
limited partnership, it is clear that.., the nature of this legal entity does place a premium on personality.").
"' In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 324 (internal citation omitted).
92 Id. ("I conclude that the trustee cannot compel the assignment of the estates' status as limited partners
over the objection of the general partner.").
93See cases cited supra note 24.
94 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
9' See id. § 271(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent."); see also Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 632-33 (1999) (explaining what might
constitute infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1296 (1 th Cir. 2003) (explaining what might constitute infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) ("Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant shall be for
a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States .... "); see also Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 3 10
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imports a patented invention within the United States or induces another
or
97
contributes to any of the foregoing, that party can be held liable as an infringer.
A license agreement, as opposed to a sale or assignment of intellectual property,
does not transfer title in the patent from the licensor to the licensee. 98 Rather,
license agreements are covenants not to sue-i.e., the licensor agrees not to sue the
licensee for patent infringement if the licensee uses the patented invention and
performs (such as by paying royalties) in accordance with the terms of the license
agreement. 99 Under federal common law, patent license agreements are personal to
the licensee'0 0 and, consequently, are not assignable by the licensee to a third party
without the consent of the licensor unless the license agreement expressly provides
otherwise. 10 1 This proposition appears to be true for both exclusive and
F.3d 1360, 1364 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating patent expires 20 years, measured from filing date of earliest
U.S. application for which priority is claimed.); Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline P.L.C., 189 F.
Supp. 2d 377, 383 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating patent holder has 20 years of exclusivity before public may
copy invention for profit).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) (2000); see also Fina Research v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1482 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (providing example of infringement based upon both 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) and (c)); Whitfield &
Sheshunoff, Inc. v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 269 F.2d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 1959) (providing example
of infringement of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)).
9'A debtor may be able to avoid the issues discussed in this article regarding section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code by arguing, in the context of an exclusive patent license, that the exclusive license was a
sale or complete assignment of the underlying intellectual property. See Black Clawson Co. v. Kroenert
Corp., 245 F.3d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding exclusive patent license may be constructive assignment if
"the parties intended a grant of all substantial rights."); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[A]n exclusive, territorial license is equivalent to an assignment and may therefore
confer standing upon the licensee to sue for patent infringement."). If a complete assignment occurred, then
the agreement is arguably not executory and thus outside the scope of section 365. A thorough analysis of
recharacterizing an exclusive patent license as a sale or complete assignment is beyond the scope of this
article.
99See Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing IntellectualProperty and Technology from the
Financially-Troubledor Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to Minimize the Risk in a Licensee's
Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. LAW. 1649, 1661-63 (2000). Covenants not to
sue may also be included in the license agreement itself. See, e.g., Syndia Corp. v. Lemelson Med., Educ., &
Research Found., Ltd. P'ship, 165 F. Supp. 2d 728, 741 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Further, parties can agree to expand
covenants not to sue beyond the particular license agreement. See, e.g., Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 275 F.
Supp. 2d 1100, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
10°An interesting issue would arise if a nondebtor licensee attempted to use section 365(c)(1) to force a
bankrupt licensor to terminate an intellectual property license that the licensor otherwise wanted to assume.
Although federal law generally restricts the right of a licensee, rather than the right of a licensor, to assign or
transfer an intellectual property license (i.e., the license agreement is personal to the licensee and not the
licensor under federal law), the license agreement could be drafted in a manner that arguably could cause the
license agreement to be characterized as a personal service contract under state law. See discussion supra
Part II.B. 1. If the license agreement were so characterized, and the licensee desired to terminate the license
agreement, the licensee could argue that section 365(c)(1) would prevent the licensor from assuming the
license. This issue is distinct from the issue raised when the debtor/licensor wants to reject the license and
nondebtor licensee desires to continue its rights under the license. This latter situation is addressed by
section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code. See generally Cieri & Morgan, supra note 99.
101See Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Federal
law holds a nonexclusive patent license to be personal and nonassignable ....
");Stenograph Corp. v.
Fulkerson, 972 F.2d 726, 729 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Patent licenses are not assignable in the absence of
express language."); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("It is well settled
that a nonexclusive licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property interest in the patent and that
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nonexclusive patent licenses.
Again, invoking section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts generally

have given effect to these restrictions on the assignment of patent licenses in
bankruptcy. 10 3 Although there is no reported case law in the First Circuit dealing

with the assignment of patent licenses in bankruptcy, a court that decided (or was
required) to follow the First Circuit's reasoning in PioneerFord Sales most likely
would restrict the assignment of the license if the license agreement were otherwise

silent.' 4 Courts that consider whether the identity of the contracting party is
material to the agreement have applied the federal rule against the assignment of
patent licenses in bankruptcy, on the theory that patent licenses are personal to the

licensee. 105
this personal right cannot be assigned unless the patent owner authorizes the assignment or the license itself
permits assignment."); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979) ("It
has long been held by federal courts that agreements granting patent licenses are personal and not assignable
unless expressly made so."); Unarco, 465 F.2d at 1306 ("The long standing federal rule of law with respect
to the assignability of patent license agreement provides that these agreements are personal to the licensee
and not assignable unless expressly made so in the agreement."); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686,
689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) ("Pursuant thereto, albeit federal common rather than statutory law, it has
long been the rule that patent licenses are personal and not assignable unless expressly made so."); see also
Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82 (1883) ("[T]he instrument of license is not one which will
carry the right conferred to any one but the licensee personally, unless there are express words to show an
intent to extend the right to an executory, administrator, or assignee."); The Troy Iron & Nail Factory v.
Coming, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852) ("A mere license to a party, without having his assigns or equivalent
words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the grant of a personal power to the
licensees, and it not transferable by him to another.").
102 See In re Hernandez, 285 B.R. 435, 440 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) ("The court ..,finds that applicable
federal patent law would require the consent of the Licensor to assign the License in this case even if the
License is exclusive.").
103See In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 754-55 (finding because the debtor-licensee could not
assign the patent license to a hypothetical third party, the debtor-licensee could not assume the patent license
pursuant to section 365(c)(1)); In re Hernandez, 285 B.R. at 442 (stating same); In re Access Beyond
Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 48-49 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (stating same); In reAlltech Plastics,Inc., 71 B.R. at
689 (finding that the trustee was without authority to assign a patent license absent consent from the
licensor).
104An argument could be made, however, that a court that decided to follow or was required to follow
PioneerFord should not enforce such restrictions in bankruptcy because the Patent Act does not restrict the
assignment of nonexclusive licenses "whether or not" the license agreement is silent. See In re Pioneer Ford
Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984) ("As a matter of logic, however, we see no conflict, for (c)(1)(A)
refers to state laws that prohibit assignment 'whether or not' the contract is silent, while (f)(1) contains no
such limitation."). The First Circuit did not address this issue in Institut Pasteurv. Cambridge Biotech Corp.,
104 F.3d 489, 494-95 (1st Cir. 1997), because the First Circuit found that the transfer of the debtor's stock to
a third party did not effect an assignment of the debtor's patent licenses under state law.
105See In re CatapultEntm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 750 ("[O]ur precedents make it clear that federal patent law
constitutes 'applicable law' within the meaning of § 365(c), and that nonexclusive patent licenses are
'personal and assignable only with the consent of the licensor."') (quoting In re CFLC, 89 F.3d at 680)); In re
Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. at 45 (stating longstanding federal rule of law with respect to
assignability of patent license agreements provides that these agreements are personal to licensee and not
assignable unless expressly made so in agreement) (citing Unarco, 465 F.2d at 1306)); In re Alltech Plastics
Inc., 71 B.R. at 689 ("[A]lthough their nonassignment is not statutorily mandated, the century old common
law classification of patent licenses appears to place them within the realm of the types of contracts
traditionally associated with section 365(c).").
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For example, in Catapult Entertainment, a software company commenced a
case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor in possession sought to

assume certain patent licenses as a part of its plan of reorganization, and the party
that granted the debtor the right to use certain relevant technologies objected. The
lower courts granted the debtor's motion and approved the plan of reorganization.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and
found that, under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor could not

assume the patent licenses10 6 because, under federal patent law, patent licenses are

"personal and assignable only with the consent of the licensor.",0 7 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit concluded
that the debtor could not assume or assign the underlying
0 8

patent licenses.

b.

Copyright Licenses

Like patent licenses, nonexclusive copyright licenses also are not assignable by

the licensee without the consent of the licensor unless the license agreement
provides otherwise.' 0 9 There is a split of authority, however, as to whether exclusive
copyright licenses are freely assignable by the licensee." 0 Under the, Copyright Act,
'06 See In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 754-55 ("[W]here applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an
executory contract nonassignable because the identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in
possession may not assume the contract absent consent of the nondebtor party."). As suggested above, in
Catapult, the Ninth Circuit restricted the debtor's ability to assume the patent licenses. A detailed discussion
of this type of prohibition on assumption alone can be found at Section IV of the article.
'07Id. at 750 ("[O]ur precedents make it clear that federal patent law constitutes 'applicable law' within the
meaning of § 365(c), and that nonexclusive patent licenses are 'personal and assignable only with the consent
of the licensor."') (quotation omitted).
10 Id. at 754-55.
109 See PlayMedia Sys. v. Am. Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Copyright
licenses are presumed to prohibit any use not authorized .... A non-exclusive licensee such as
Nullsoft/AOL has 'no right to re-sell or sublicense the rights acquired unless he has been expressly
authorized to do so."') (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984)); In re
Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ("A non-exclusive license of rights by a
copyright owner to another party is not assignable by that party without the permission of the copyright
holder under federal copyright law since the license represents only a personal and not a property interest in
the copyright."); In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 BR. 300, 311 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (finding
licenses relating to Scooby-Doo and the Power Puff Girls nonexclusive and non-assignable under copyright
law.); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[Tlhe nonexclusive
license is personal to the transferee . .. and the licensee cannot assign it to a third party without the consent
of the copyright owner.").
110Compare In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R.
at 318-19:
The more natural reading of § 201 (d) is that Congress intended exclusive licensees
to have all of the rights of an owner to the extent the license is intended to cover each
of these rights. The court therefore declines to adopt the holding of the Gardner court
and instead finds, in accordance with Patient Educ. Media and Nimmer, that exclusive
licenses have the right to freely assign their rights.
Id.; In re PatientEduc. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. at 240 ("Ownership is the sine qua non of the right to transfer,
and the copyright law distinguishes between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses. A 'transfer of copyright
ownership' includes the grant of an exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license."); Melville B. Nimmer,
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a party that creates a work of authorship, including a literary work, motion pictures,
sound recordings, architectural works and the like, has a copyright in such work'
from the date of the work's creation until 70 years after the author's death.' 2 A
copyright gives the owner the exclusive right to (i) reproduce the copyrighted work,
(ii) prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, (iii) distribute copies
of the copyrighted work, (iv) perform the work publicly and (v) display the work
publicly. 13 If a party violates any of these exclusive rights of the copyright owner,
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[B][4] (2004) ("Generalizing from the foregoing, sound policy reasons
combine with copyright's constitutional moorings to construe exclusive licenses as transferable. It is
therefore submitted that the district and circuit court rulings in Gardner v. Nike should not be followed."),
with Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e hold that the 1976 Act does not allow a
copyright licensee to transfer its rights under an exclusive license, without the consent of the original
licensor."); see also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The 'transfer of copyright
ownership' is defined, in the Copyright Act, as an exclusive license or some other instrument of conveyance.
The definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license.").
n. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompany music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
112 Id. § 302(a) (1976) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1978, subsists from its creation
and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and 70 years after the author's death."). With respect to joint works, the duration of the copyright generally is
70 years after the death of the last surviving author, and with respect to anonymous works and works for
hire, the duration of the copyright is 95 years from the year of its first publication or 120 years from the year
of its creation, whichever expires first. See id. § 302(b), (c) (1976).
13 Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides:
Subject to section 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
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that party can be held liable as an infringer. 1 4 An exclusive license to a copyright is
considered a transfer of copyright ownership under the Copyright Act." 5 For this
reason, courts, excluding the Ninth Circuit, have found that exclusive licenses to
copyrights are freely assignable by the licensee." 6 In contrast, a nonexclusive
license to a copyright is not a transfer of copyright ownership under the Copyright
Act. 1 7 Thus, under federal law, most nonexclusive license agreements in
copyrighted material are personal to the licensee and, consequently, are not
of the licensor unless the license
assignable to third parties without the consent
18
agreement expressly provides otherwise.'
Id. 4§ 106 (1976).
1" Id. § 501(a):
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided in sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided in section 106(A)(a),
or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section
602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.
Id.
"' See id. § 101 ("A 'transfer of copyright ownership' is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.").
16See cases cited supra note 110.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; id. § 201(d)(2) ("The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the
...
extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title."); See
also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[B][4]:
The limitations on a licensee's right to re-sell or sublicense under the 1909 Act
would appear to continue under the current Act with respect to nonexclusive licensees,
but not as to exclusive licensees. The latter having acquired 'title' or ownership of the
rights conveyed, may recover them absent contractual restrictions.
Id.

I8

See cases cited supra note 109. A distinction should be made, however, for shrinkwrap licenses

provided with the sale of software because courts generally have found that the purchase of copyrighted
software constitutes a sale of goods rather than a license to use the software. See Softman Prods. Co., L.L.C.
v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2001):
The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly
suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license. For example, the
purchaser commonly obtains a single copy of the software, with documentation, for a
single price, which the purchaser pays at the time of the transaction, and which
constitutes the entire payment for the 'license.' The license runs for a indefinite term
without provisions for renewal. In light of these indicia, many courts and commentators
conclude that a 'shrinkwrap license' transaction is a sale of goods rather than a license.
Id.; Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (D. Utah 1997), vacated in part by
187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999):
[Tihe purchaser is an 'owner by way of sale and is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the software with the same rights as exist in the purchaser of any other
good. Said software transactions do not merely constitute the sale of a license to use the
software. The shrinkwrap license included with the software is therefore invalid as
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Again, invoking section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts generally
have given effect to these restrictions on the assignment of nonexclusive copyright
licenses in bankruptcy." 9 While there is no reported case law in the First Circuit
dealing with the assignment of nonexclusive copyright licenses in bankruptcy, a
court that decided (or was required) to follow the First Circuit's reasoning in
Pioneer FordSales would likely prohibit the assignment of the license if the license

agreement were otherwise silent. 120 Courts that consider whether the identity of the
contracting party is material to the agreement have applied the federal rule against
the assignment of copyright licenses in bankruptcy because nonexclusive copyright
121

licenses are personal to the licensee.

For example, in Sunterra Corp., a company that owned and managed numerous
resort properties filed a case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 12 2 Before
filing, the debtor had launched a program called "Club Sunterra," under which

timeshare owners at Sunterra resorts could trade their timeshare rights for similar

against such a purchaser insofar as it purports to maintain title to the software in the
copyright owner.
Id. But cf Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("[T]he
[distribution agreement that permits the distributors to engage in limited re-distribution of copyrighted
software subject to a shrink-wrap End User License Agreement] should be characterized as a license, rather
than a sale."); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("[T]he
Court holds that.., the [Off Campus Reseller Agreement under which an educational reseller makes
Educational Software Products available to customers that are Educational End Users] is a licensing
agreement.").
119See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2004)
(finding debtor-licensee could not assume nonexclusive license of copyrighted software pursuant to section
365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R.105, 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ("Since
non-exclusive licenses may not be assigned under applicable non-bankruptcy law [such as federal copyright
law], they may not be assumed by the debtor in possession."); In re BuildNet, Inc., No. 01-82293, 2002
Bankr. LEXIS 1851, at *18 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2002) (finding copyright licenses nonassignable
under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code by debtor-licensee); In re Golden Books Family Entm't.,
Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 309 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (finding four license agreements relating to Scooby-Doo and
Power Puff Girls nonexclusive licenses therefore non-assignable under copyright law); In re Patient Educ.
Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding debtor-licensee could not sell nonexclusive
license to use copyrighted photographs under section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code).
120Again, an argument could be made that a court that decided to follow or was required
to follow Pioneer
FordSales should not enforce such restrictions in bankruptcy because the Copyright Act does not restrict the
assignment of licenses "whether or not" the license agreement is silent. See Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729
F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984) ("As a matter of logic, however, we see no conflict, for (c)(1)(A) refers to state
laws that prohibit assignment 'whether or not' the contract is silent, while (f)(1) contains no such
limitation.").
121See In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 135 ("A non-exclusive license of rights
by a copyright owner
to another party is not assignable by that party without the permission of the copyright holder under federal
copyright law since the license represents only a personal and not a property interest in the copyright."); In
re Golden Books Family Entm't., Inc., 269 B.R. at 309 ("Under copyright law, 'a nonexclusive
licensee ... has only a personal and not a property interest in the [intellectual property],' which 'cannot be
assigned unless the [intellectual property] owner authorizes the assignment ....... (quoting In re Patient
Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. at 242-43)).
122See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 257.
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rights at other Sunterra resorts.123 The debtor needed software to facilitate the
trading. Thus, the debtor entered into a software license agreement with RCI
Technology Corp. under which it obtained a nonexclusive license to use and modify
certain copyrighted software. 12 4 After filing its bankruptcy case, the debtor sought
to assume the license of copyrighted software, and RCI Technology Corporation
objected on the grounds that the license did not expressly permit assignment.
The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and held that the license
agreement was not an executory contract, and, even if it were, section 365(c)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code did not prohibit the debtor from assuming the agreement
because no assignment was contemplated. The district court disagreed with the
bankruptcy court's finding that the license agreement was not executory, stating that
"there is a long line of authority holding that intellectual property licensing
agreements ... are executory contracts." 125 The district court, however, affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code did not
prohibit the debtor from assuming the agreement. 126 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and found that, under
section 365(c)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor could not assume the license
127
agreement.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the license agreement was
executory under the Countryman definition, 128 but disagreed with the district court
and the bankruptcy court as to the correct application of section 365(c)(1). The
Fourth Circuit reconciled the apparent conflict between sections 365(c)(1)
and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code by finding the term "applicable law" in
section 365(c)(1) to refer to specific laws that excuse a contracting party from
rendering performance to, or accepting performance from, a third party.129 It further
113Id. at 260.
214Id. ("In 1997, RCI and Sunterra entered into a software license agreement (the 'Agreement'), pursuant
to which RCI granted Sunterra a nonexclusive license to use Premier Software (the 'Software').").
125RCC Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp., 287 B.R. 864, 865 (D.
Md. 2003):

The Bankruptcy Court found that the [software license] is not an executory
contract. If the Bankruptcy Court had been writing on a clean slate, there might be
merit in its reasoning. However, there is a long line of authority holding that intellectual
property licensing agreements such as the [software license] are executory contracts.
Id.

116Id. at 866 ("I find the actual test to be far more harmonious with the statutory scheme."). See Section

III.B. infra for a discussion of the actual test.
127See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 271-72 ("Without RCI's consent, Sunterra was precluded from
assuming the Agreement. Pursuant to the foregoing, the bankruptcy court erred, and the district court erred
in affirming the bankruptcy court. We therefore reverse, and we remand for such other and further
proceedings as may be appropriate.").
128 Id. at 264 ("[W]e agree with the district court that the Agreement was executory when Sunterra
petitioned for bankruptcy.").
129Id. at 266 ("Therefore, under the broad rule of § 365(f)(1), the 'applicable law' is the law prohibiting or
restricting assignments as such; whereas the 'applicable law' under § 365(c)(1) embraces 'legal excuses for
refusing to render or accept performance, regardless of the contract's status as assignable ......")(citing
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determined that federal copyright law was "applicable law" under section 365(c)(1)
because it excused RCI Corporation from accepting performance from an entity
other than the debtor. 130 Accordingly, the Fourth 13Circuit concluded that the debtor
could not assume or assign the copyright licenses. 1
In contrast to the cases dealing with nonexclusive copyright licenses, at least
one court has held that an exclusive copyright license is not subject to
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 132 Again, an exclusive copyright license
is considered a transfer of copyright ownership under the Copyright Act.133 For this
reason, the bankruptcy court in Golden Books Family Entertainment held that
section 365(c)(1) does not prevent the assumption or assignment of exclusive
copyright licenses. 134 A court that adopted or was required to follow the Ninth
Circuit's position on the assignability of exclusive copyright licenses, however,
might reach a different result and find exclusive copyright licenses,
in addition to
35
nonexclusive copyright licenses, subject to section 365(c)(1).1
c.

TrademarkLicenses

136
Licenses to use trademarks generally are not assignable to third parties.

Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 699 (6th Cir. 1992) (Guy, J.,
concurring)).
130Id. at 262 n.7 ("Because the Software is a duly registered copyrighted computer program, copyright law
is the applicable nonbankruptcy law that would excuse RCI from accepting performance under the
Agreement from an entity other than Sunterra.").
3,1Id. at 271 ("Without RCI's consent, Sunterra was precluded from assuming the Agreement.").
132See In re Golden Books Family Entme't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001):
The court finds that the Madeline Agreement is an exclusive license. The court
also finds that, under applicable copyright law, exclusive licenses convey an ownership
interest to the licensee that allows that licensee to freely transfer its rights. Therefore, in
this case, copyright law does not prevent the assumption and assignment of the
Madeline Agreement.
Id.; In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (exclusive licensee "may
freely transfer his rights, and moreover, the licensor cannot transfer the same rights to anyone else."). But see
Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (analyzing the Copyright Act and
holding licensees cannot freely transfer rights even under exclusive license).
133 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating "transfer of copyright ownership" includes the grant of exclusive license,
but not nonexclusive license).
134See In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. at 313-19 (finding exclusive copyright license
not affected by section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code because of 17 U.S.C. § 101).
...
See Gardner,279 F.3d at 781 ("[W]e hold that federal law governs the present case and that exclusive
licenses are only assignable with the consent of the licensor."); see also In re Golden Books Family Entm't,
Inc., 269 B.R. at 318 (rejecting Ninth Circuit's decision in Gardner in finding exclusive copyright license not
sub'ect to section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code).
In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 447, 455 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002):
For trademark law to preclude assumability of the Travelot-CNN Contract, the
Contract must be construed as containing a non-exclusive trademark license. The grant
of a non-exclusive license is 'an assignment in gross,' that is, one personal to the
assignee and thus not freely assignable to a third party .... Accordingly, a licensor
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Under the Lanham Act, the term "trademark" is defined as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used by a person] to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown."' 137 The owner of a trademark used in commerce or intended for use in
commerce may register the trademark. 138 The federal registration of a trademark
does not create or enhance an exclusive property right, as the owner of the
39
trademark acquires his or her exclusive rights therein by prior use in commerce.'
If a party violates the trademark of another by using the trademark in a manner that
is likely to cause confusion or misrepresent the nature of the party's goods, that
140
party can be held liable as an infringer or otherwise liable for civil damages. 141
need not accept performance to an entity other than the licensee.
Id.; Tap Pubrns, Inc. v. Chinese Yellow Pages (New York) Inc., 925 F. Supp. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[T]he general rule is that unless the license states otherwise, the licensee's right to use the licensed mark is
personal and cannot be assigned to another."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:33 (4th ed. 2004):
While the case law is sparse, it appears to be the rule that unless the license states
otherwise, a licensed mark is personal and cannot be assigned. The rule as to
nonexclusive licenses of patents and copyrights is the same: the license is a personal
right and cannot be transferred by the licensee to another without the permission of the
licensor.
Id.; see Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[Ihe licensee
acquires only the right to a limited use of the trademark and the control, right and title to the product remains
in the licensor."); Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 211 U.S.P.Q. 28, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
("Member banks may not assign their contractual right to use the VISA logo in an unauthorized manner
without the consent of the licensor. Such assignment being void, the assignee of the right acquires
nothing."); Delta Tire Corp. v. Marion, 159 U.S.P.Q. 601, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1968):
It has not been alleged that Oliver & Winston had any rights to sue the Delta
trademark apart from the sale of Delta Tires made by the Delta Tire Corporation.
Therefore, it does not appear that Oliver & Winston had the authority to assign or
license to defendant any rights to the Delta trademark; an assignment or license of the
trademark would not be effective as against the Delta Tire Corporation ....
Id.; cf Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.C. Ill. 1972) (finding that
anti-assignment provision in trademark license agreement was "eminently reasonable."); McCullough v.
Dairy Queen of Mich., Inc., 121 U.S.P.Q. 302, 304 (W.D. Mich. 1959) (finding that provision in contract
prohibiting assignment of trademark without licensor's consent was valid). But see In re Rooster, Inc., 100
B.R. 228, 232-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding trademark license assignable by bankrupt licensee because
license agreement was not personal service contract).
137 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
38

' See id. § 1051.
139See In re Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361,

1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The federal
registration of trademarks does not create an exclusive property right in the mark. The owner of the mark
already has the property right established by prior use."); Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Mo.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Unlike the registration of a patent, a trademark registration of itself
does not create the underlying right to exclude. Nor is a trademark created by registration.").
140Section 1114(1) of the Lanham Act provides:
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Because a trademark, by definition, is used to identify goods with a person or
business, 142 a trademark cannot be assigned apart from the goodwill of the business
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a

registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or
damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
As used in this paragraph, the term "any person" includes the United States, all
agencies and instrumentalities thereof, and all individuals, firms, corporations, or other
persons acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the
United States, and any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity.
The United States, all agencies and instrumentalities thereof, and all individuals, firms,
corporations, other persons acting for the United States and with the authorization and
consent of the United States, and any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to
the same extent as any governmental entity.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000). A party also can be liable as an infringer under state law for using a trademark
registered under state law. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14320(a)(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
3312(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.131(2); § 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/60(b); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360k(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.65(B); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.12(2).
Section 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities,
shall be held liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely
to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000). A party also can be liable under state law for using a trademark registered
under state law. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14320(a)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 3312(1); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 495.13 1(1); § 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/60(a); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-k(a); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1329.65(A); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-92.12(1).
142See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The fundamental purpose of a trademark
is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source
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with which the mark has been associated.143 The owner of a trademark may license
the use of the trademark to another party as long as the owner takes affirmative
steps to ensure that the product sold by the licensee is of the same quality as the
product sold by the licensor. 144 The grant of a trademark license generally is
145
considered personal to the licensee
and cannot be freely transferred to a third
46
law.1
common
federal
party under
of the particular goods."); In re Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1367 ("It is well
established... that the purpose of a trademark is to distinguish goods and to identify the source of goods.");
Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The purpose of the rule prohibiting the
sale or assignment of a trademark in gross is to prevent a consumer from being misled or confused as to the
source and nature of the goods or services that he or she acquires.").
141See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2000) (mark "shall be assignable with the goodwill of the
business in
which the mark is used."); see also Vittoria N. Am., L.L.C. v. Euro-Asia Imports Inc., 278 F.3d 1076, 1082
(10th Cir. 2001) ("Courts have consistently held that a valid assignment of a trademark or service mark
requires the transfer of the goodwill associated with the mark."); Sugar Busters, 177 F.3d at 265 ("The sale
or assignment of a trademark without the goodwill that the mark represents is characterized as in gross and is
invalid."); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 956 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
transfer of a trademark apart from the goodwill of the business which it represents is an invalid 'naked' or 'in
gross' assignment, which passes no right to the assignee."); Bermi v. Int'l Gourmet Rests. of Am., Inc., 838
F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating same).
144See Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Naked (or uncontrolled)
licensing of a mark occurs when a licensor allows a licensee to use the mark on any quality of good the
licensee chooses ....[S]uch a practice is inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights to
the trademark by the licensor."); AmCAN Enters., Inc. v. Renzi, 32 F.3d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1994):
[T]he owner of a trademark is allowed to license its use, provided that it takes effective
steps to ensure that the product sold by the licensee is of the same quality as the product
sold by the licensor under the same name, so that consumers are not deceived by the
identity of names into buying products different from what they reasonably expected.
Id.; In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 447, 455 ("[I]t appears well settled... [that] to be the recipient of a license
to use [a] trademark, there must have been (1) a grant of... permission to use [the] mark and (2) retention of
quality
control by [the licensor] over [the licensee's] use of the mark in the Contract.").
45
1

See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:33:

While the case law is sparse, it appears to be the rule that unless the license states
otherwise, a licensed mark is personal and cannot be assigned. The rule as to
nonexclusive licenses of patents and copyrights is the same: the license is a personal
right and cannot be transferred by the licensee to another without the permission of the
licensor.
Id.

146 See

cases cited supra note 136; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000). The Lanham Act is silent as to

licensing; thus, there is no provision in the Lanham Act comparable to section 101 of the Copyright Act. In
this respect, federal trademark law appears to be more akin to federal patent law. Again, a debtor may be
able to avoid the issues discussed in this Article regarding section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code by
arguing, in the context of an exclusive trademark license, that the exclusive license was a sale or complete
assignment of the underlying intellectual property. See Ste. Pierre Smirnoff, Fls., Inc. v. Hirsch, 109 F. Supp.
10, 12 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ("It has been repeatedly held over a long period of time that the grant of an exclusive
and irrevocable right to use a mark in a designated territory is an assignment and not a mere license."). If a
complete assignment occurred, then the agreement arguably is not executory and thus outside the scope of
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. A thorough analysis of recharacterizing an exclusive trademark license
as a sale or complete assignment, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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Indeed, if a third party were to use a federally registered trademark in
accordance with a license agreement purportedly assigned to such third party
without consent of the 47licensor, such third party could be liable as an infringer
under the Lanham Act.1
At least one bankruptcy court has suggested that federal trademark law
constitutes "applicable law" under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 48 In
Travelot, a web-based travel bookings company filed a chapter 11 case. Before
filing, the debtor entered into a contract with the Cable News Network ("CNN")
under which CNN would provide Travelot with "popup" adds on CNN.com, and
Travelot agreed to purchase advertising from CNN and pay a "licensing fee." This
"licensing fee," however, was not tied to Travelot's use of CNN's trademarks but
was part of the total consideration paid by Travelot to CNN for the "popup" adds.
When Travelot missed the first and second installment payments due under the
contract and failed to procure the necessary technology to integrate Travelot's
website with CNN.com, CNN declared Travelot in default. Travelot thereafter filed
its bankruptcy case to preserve its contract rights with CNN.
CNN filed a motion to dismiss Travelot's bankruptcy case, asserting, among
other things, that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibited the debtor
from assuming the contract because the contract provided Travelot with a license to
use CNN's trademarks on its website.149 The bankruptcy court ultimately concluded50
that the contract did not provide Travelot with a license to use CNN's trademarks.
Thus, Travelot was not precluded from assuming the contract under
section 365(c)(1). 15' Although ultimately not pertinent to its holding, the bankruptcy
court in Travelot initially observed that, without authorization, a party cannot use
another's federally registered trademark in commerce under the Lanham Act 52 and
suggested that federal trademark law would be "applicable law" under

147See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) ("Any person who shall, without the consent of registrant, use a trademark,
be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided."); see, e.g., Lopes
v. Int'l Rubber Distribs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981-83 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) and
discussing resulting application).
148See In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 447, 455 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002) ("Trademark law is 'applicable law'
under § 365(c).") (emphasis removed).
149
See id. 286 B.R. at 453.
150 Id. at 459 ("Conclusion: The Contract does not contain a trademark license grant to Travelot.")
(emphasis removed).
I Id. at 462 ("The Travelot Company as Debtor-in-Possession IS NOT PRECLUDED as a matter of law
from attempting to assume the contract with CNN by application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) ....
...shall

152Id. at

455:
A trademark registrant may successfully sue an infringer upon a showing that the
infringer, without authorization from the registrant, used the mark in commerce and
that the unauthorized use caused or was likely to cause confusion or deception ....
With authorization, however, a would-be infringer may use another's registered
trademark in commerce.
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153
section 365(c)(1) for licenses to federally registered trademarks.
At least one bankruptcy court, however, considered only whether a trademark
license agreement constitutes a personal service contract under state law to
determine whether the agreement could be assigned in bankruptcy without the
consent of the licensor. 154 In Rooster, a company that manufactured and sold men's
neckwear filed a case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Before filing, the
debtor entered into a license agreement with Bill Bass and Pincus Brothers Inc.
("Pincus") under which the debtor paid royalties to Pincus, and Pincus permitted the
debtor to use the "Bill Bass" trademark on its neckwear. Under the terms of the
trademark license agreement, the debtor was subject to substantial supervision by
Pincus with respect to the designs and materials
to which the "Bill Bass" trademark
155
could attach, as required for a valid license.
Pincus sought relief from the automatic stay in order to terminate the debtor's
rights under the trademark license agreement. It does not appear that Pincus argued
that the requested relief was appropriate pursuant to federal trademark law. Rather,
Pincus introduced evidence that the trademark license agreement was a personal
service contract under Pennsylvania law because the debtor was given the license
after Pincus had carefully considered the debtor's financial status, physical plant and
key personnel to ensure that the debtor's "taste" was in harmony with the fashion
sense of Bill Bass. 156 The bankruptcy court rejected this argument on the grounds
that Pincus' control over the debtor's use of the "Bill Bass" trademark meant that the
debtor's performance under the trademark license agreement did not depend upon
"any special personal relationship, knowledge, unique skill or talent.' 57

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied Pincus' motion for relief from the
automatic stay.
4.

Government Contracts

Executory contracts and unexpired leases to which the federal government is a
party may not be assigned outside of bankruptcy. 158 Courts generally have found

153 Id.

("If the Contract provided for Travelot to be the recipient of a trademark license, then applicable

trademark law precludes assignment of that trademark.").
154In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228, 232-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
...
Id. at 230 ("[U]nder the licensing agreement sub judice, Ex. P-i, the debtor is subject to a substantial
amount of supervision and control by Bill Bass and Pincus ... .
116Id.at 230-3 1.
157Id. at 233-34 ("1 cannot conclude that the debtor's performance under the licensing agreement draws
upon any special personal relationship, knowledge, unique skill or talent ....Instead, I find that this actual
control over Rooster's performance removes Rooster's duties from the sphere of personal service and from
the ambit of§ 365(c)(l)(A).").
158See cases cited supra note 25. In some circumstances, an executory contract to which a state
government is a party may not be assigned outside of bankruptcy under state law. See, e.g., In re Nitec Paper
Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding debtor could not sell excess power generated by NiagraMohawk Power Corporation, a political subdivision of State of New York, pursuant to section 365(c)(1) of
Bankruptcy Code, where right to purchase excess power was "nondelegable" under New York law). The
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that this prohibition continues to apply in bankruptcy, pursuant to section 365(c)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, a debtor may not assign (and may be
prohibited
from assuming) contracts or leases to which the federal government is a
59
party.

1

The Anti-Assignment Act prevents the original contracting party from
transferring a contract with the federal government to a third party. 160 The purpose
of the Anti-Assignment Act is to allow the federal government to deal exclusively
with the original party (rather than, for example, multiple subcontractors) to prevent
persons from obtaining claims against the government and using them to influence
officers of the government. 61 Thus, the purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act is
majority of cases dealing with governmental contracts and section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code,
however, concern contracts to which the federal government is a party.
159
See In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d. Cir. 1988) (finding debtor could not assume contract for
manufacturing services with a defense contractor); In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 864 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1999) (finding debtor could not assume government contract pursuant to section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code); In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 B.R. 496, 501 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding debtor
could not assume a contract with the United States Department of Navy under section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code); United States Dep't of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In re Carolina Parachute
Corp.), 108 B.R. 100, 103 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (finding debtor did not have authority to assume a contract with
United States Air Force); Pa. Peer Review Org. v. United States (In re Pa. Peer Review Org.), 50 B.R. 640,
645 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding debtor could not assume a contract with agencies and official of the
United States government under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); Gov't Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v.
Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc,), 12 BR. 977, 985 (Bankr. D. Ga.
1980) (finding debtor could not assume or assign guarantee an agreement pursuant to Anti-Assignment Act).
But see In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 319, 328 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (stating it was "not at all clear that
the Anti-Assignment Act limits assumption of contracts in chapter 11."); In re Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 164 B.R.
358, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (finding debtor did have authority to assume a contract with the United
States Department of Navy notwithstanding section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Ontario
Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies, (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating same);
In re Hartec Enters., Inc., 117 B.R. 865, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("The 'actual' test better fulfills the
puioses of anti-assignment statutes, including specifically 41 U.S.C. § 15.").
41 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1996):
No contract or order, or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the party to
whom such contract or order is given to any other party, and any such transfer shall
cause the annulment of the contract or order transferred, so far as the United States is
concerned. All rights of action, however, for any breach of such contract by the
contracting parties, are reserved to the United States.
Id.
161Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 334, 343 (1999) (quoting Monchamp
Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 797, 801 (1990)):
Past judicial interpretation of the Act leaves no doubt that it is intended for the benefit
of the Government, and that it serves two primary purposes: "first, to prevent persons of
influence from buying up claims against the United States, which might then be
improperly urged upon officers of the Government; and second, to enable the United
States to deal exclusively with the original claimant instead of several parties."
Id.; Summerfield Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 160, 172 (1998) ("[Statute was] enacted in
order to allow government to deal exclusively with original claimant, and enable government to be aware of
its obligations."); Patterson v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 819, 827 (1965) ("[T]he purposes generally imputed
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unrelated to the nature of the contract in question-i.e., it applies regardless of
whether (a) the contract is one for personal services or (b) the identity of the party is
effect to the
material to the contract. Nonetheless, courts generally have given
62
1
365(c)(1).
section
invoking
bankruptcy,
in
Act
Anti-Assignment
For example, in Techdyn Systems, the bankruptcy court considered whether a
debtor whose primary business involved furnishing telephone systems and support
to military bases could assume or assign six contracts that it had entered into prepetition with the United States Army. 163 The government argued that the AntiAssignment Act, read in conjunction with section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code, prohibited the assignment or assumption of these contracts.164 The
bankruptcy court did not consider whether the contracts were personal service
contracts or whether the identity of the party performing under the contracts was
material. Instead, after performing a detailed analysis of section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded that, because the Anti-Assignment Act
prohibited the assignment65of the contracts, the debtor could not assume or assign the
contracts in bankruptcy. 1
The district court in Carolina Parachute Corp. 66 reached a similar result. In
Carolina Parachute Corp., a company that manufactured parachutes and related
items for the United States Army filed a case under chapter 11.167 The debtor sought
to assume its contract with the Army under its plan of reorganization. The Army
filed a motion for modification of the automatic stay, seeking to terminate its
contract with the debtor because the debtor was delinquent in performing under the
to Congress in enacting the anti-assignment statute--of preventing fraud and immunizing the United States
from the inconvenience and uncertainty of having to deal with several parties.").
162See In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 82-83 (finding that the Anti-Assignment Act was "applicable law"
under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. at 861 (stating same);
In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 B.R. at 501 (stating same); In re Carolina Parachute Corp., 108 B.R. at
103-04 (same); In re Pa. Peer Review Org., 50 B.R. at 645 (stating same); In re Adana Mortgage Bankers
Inc., 12 B.R. at 984 (stating same). But see In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. at 332 (finding that debtor had
authority to assume government contract notwithstanding section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re
Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 164 B.R. at 363 (stating same); In re Ontario Locomotive, 126 B.R. at 148 (stating
same); In re HartecEnters. Inc., 117 BR. at 872 (stating same).
163
In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. at 859.
164 Id. at 860 ("The United States contends that the plain language of § 365(c)(1) effectively
prohibits the debtor from assuming the Fort Benning and Fort Buchanan contracts without its consent.").
5 Id. at 864 ("Because the Anti-Assignment Act plainly prohibits assignment of the debtor's contracts
with the United States Government, the debtor, in its capacity as debtor in possession, is barred by
§ 365(c)(1) from assuming those contracts over the Government's objection even though the debtor does not
intend to assign them."); see also In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 83 ("We conclude that assignment of a
contract calling for the production of military equipment is precisely what Congress intended to prevent whit
it prohibited assignments in 41 U.S.C. § 15."); In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 B.R. at 500 ("The AntiAssignment Act Prohibits the Debtor From Assuming the Contract or Options."); In re CarolinaParachute
Corp., 108 B.R. at 102 ("The Court determines that the outcome of this case is controlled by the interplay of
41 U.S.C. § 15 and 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)...."); In re Pa. Peer Review Org., 50 B.R. at 645 ("The
government argues that 41 U.S.C. § 15 prohibits the assignment of its contract with Peer Review and that the
contract is therefore unassumable under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). We agree.").
166In re CarolinaParachute Corp., 108 B.R. at 100.
161Id. at 101.
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delivery schedules set forth in the contract.1 68 The bankruptcy court denied the
motion, and the Army appealed.
Finding that relief from the automatic stay should have been granted pursuant to
the Anti-Assignment Act and section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the district
court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. 169 The district court did not consider
whether the contracts were personal service contracts or whether the identity of the
party performing under the contracts was material. The district court instead
reasoned that, because the Anti-Assignment Act would prevent a non-bankrupt
party from assigning such an agreement without the consent of the government, the
contract could not be assumed by the debtor. 170 Accordingly, the district court found
that the automatic stay should
have been modified to permit the Army to terminate
71
the contract with the debtor.'
5. Franchise Agreements
Various state laws restrict the ability of a franchisee to transfer, assign or sell a
franchise (or interest therein) without the consent of the franchisor. 7 2 Such
restrictions are particularly prevalent in laws that govern the transfer or assignment
of automobile franchises. 173 For example, in Florida, a motor vehicle dealer must
168

Id.

169 Id. at 103-04 ("Accordingly, following the legal reasoning of the Third Circuit
in Matter of West

Electronics, the Court determines that the automatic stay should have been modified to allow the
government to terminate the contract with debtor, pursuant to the provisions of 41 U.S.C. § 15.").
70
Id. at 103.
171 Courts applying the "actual test" under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code have found that a
party to a government contract can assume such contract even when the assignment of such contract would
be prohibited under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and 41 U.S.C. § 15. See In re Mirant Corp.,
303 B.R. 319, 325 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that the debtor had authority to assume a contract with
the United States notwithstanding Anti-Assignment Act); In re Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 164 B.R. 358, 363
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that the debtor did have authority to assume a contract with the United
States Department of Navy notwithstanding section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Ontario
Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies, (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating same);
In re Hartec Enters., Inc., 117 B.R. 865, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("The 'actual' test better fulfills the
purposes of anti-assignment statutes, including specifically 41 U.S.C. § 15.").
1 2 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-205(a) (Michie 2004) ("It shall be a violation of this subchapter for
any franchisee to transfer, assign, or sell a franchise or interest therein to another person ....
); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:10-6 (West 2004):
It shall be a violation of this act for any franchisee to transfer, assign or sell a franchise
or interest therein to another person unless the franchisee shall first notify the
franchisor of such intention by written notice setting forth in the notice of intent the
prospective transferee's name, address, statement of financial qualification and business
experience during the previous 5 years. The franchisor shall ... either approve in
writing to the franchisee such sale to proposed transferee or by written notice advise the
franchisee of the unacceptability of the proposed transferee setting forth material
reasons relating to the character, financial ability or business experience of the
proposed transferee.
Id.
"' CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.3(e) (Deering 2000):
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first notify the manufacturer in writing of its intent to transfer its franchise
agreement to another party and set forth the financial qualifications and business
experience of the proposed transferee. 74 Upon notification, the manufacturer has
60 days to reject the proposed assignment (or else the manufacturer is deemed to
have consented to the assignment). 175 If the manufacturer rejects the proposed
transfer, it must notify the dealer in writing of the material reasons for the
It is unlawful and a violation of this code for any manufacturer, manufacturer branch,
distributor, or distributor branch licensed under this code to do any of the
following: ...(e) To prevent, or attempt to prevent, a dealer from receiving fair and
reasonable compensation for the value of the franchises business. There shall be no
transfer or assignment of the dealer's franchise without the consent of the manufacturer
or distributor, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld or conditioned upon
the release, assignment, novation, waiver, estoppel, or modification of any claim or
defense by the dealer.
Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.643(l)(a) (West 2005):
A motor vehicle dealer who desires to sell, assign, transfer, alienate, or otherwise
dispose of a franchise shall notify, or cause the proposed transferee to notify, the
licensee, in writing, setting forth the prospective transferee's name, address, financial
qualifications, and business experience during the previous 5 years. A licensee ...shall
notify the motor vehicle dealer, in writing, that the proposed transferee is not a person
qualified to be a transferee under this section and setting forth the material reasons for
such rejection.
Id.; IND. CODE § 9-23-3-11 (2004) ("A dealer, an officer, a partner, or a stockholder may not sell, transfer, or
assign the franchise or a right under the franchise without the consent of the manufacturer or distributor,
which consent may not be unreasonably withheld."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4(c)(7) (2004):
It shall be deemed a violation of this chapter for a manufacturer, or officer, agent,
or other representative: ...(7) To prevent or attempt to prevent by contract or
otherwise any new motor vehicle dealer or any officer, partner, or stockholder of any
new motor vehicle dealer from selling or transferring any part of the interest of any of
them to any other person or persons or party or parties. Provided, however, that no
dealer, officer, or stockholder shall have the right to sell, transfer or assign the franchise
or power of management or control without the consent of the manufacturer, except
that the consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2000):
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer
engaged in commerce, in any district court of the United States in the district in which
said manufacturer resides, or is found, or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit by
reason of the failure of said automobile manufacturer from and after the passage of this
Act to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions
of the franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with said
dealer: Provided, That in any such suit the manufacturer shall not be barred from
asserting in defense of any such action the failure of the dealer to act in good faith.
Id.
174FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.643(l)(a) (West 2004).
175Id.
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rejection. 7 6 The dealer can then file a complaint seeking a declaration that the
rejection violates Florida law. 177 In this respect, Florida law, like the laws of other
states, restricts the assignment of automobile franchises.
Because, in certain circumstances, nonbankruptcy law restricts the ability of a
franchisee to assign or transfer its interest in the franchise agreement, some courts
have found that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to restrict the
assignment of franchise agreements in bankruptcy. 78 For example, in Van Ness
Auto Plaza, the bankruptcy court considered whether a bankrupt automobile dealer
could assume and assign its franchise agreement with Porsche to another
automobile dealer. The bankruptcy court found that the California Vehicle Code
restricted the transfer of the franchise agreement with Porsche because the
agreement could not be assigned absent Porsche's consent (unless Porsche's refusal
was unreasonable). 79 The bankruptcy court examined Porsche's basis for
withholding consent and found that Porsche was not being unreasonable.' 80
Upon concluding that the bankrupt automobile dealer could not transfer its
interest in the franchise agreement to another party under California law, the
bankruptcy court, following the First Circuit's decision in Pioneer Ford Sales,
determined that the franchise agreement fell within the scope of section 365(c)(1) of
176 Id.
177 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.643(l)(b) (West 2004).

178See In re Pioneer Ford Sales Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding an automobile franchise
agreement could not be assigned under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Van Ness Auto
Plaza, 120 B.R. 545, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990) ("[S]ection 365(c)(1) applies to state statutes restricting
transfer of automobile dealership franchises."). But see City of Jamestown, Tenn. v. James Cable Partners,
L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 538 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (finding a city ordinance
prohibiting assignment of cable franchise without city approval was a mere general prohibition of
assignment and thus insufficient to constitute applicable law under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code); In re Sunrise Rests., Inc., 135 BR. 149, 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding a Burger King
franchise was not a personal service contract and, therefore, was assignable); In re Tom Stimus ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 134 BR. 676, 679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding a franchise agreement was assignable
because "the franchise agreement [was] not 'a personal service contract .... '); In re Bronx-Westchester
Mack Corp., 20 B.R. 139, 143 (Bankr. N.Y. 1982) (finding a distributorship agreement was not a personal
service contract and, therefore, was assignable); Varisco v. Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634,
638 (Bankr. Fla. 1981) (finding a franchise agreement to market and distribute baked goods was assignable
because it was not a personal service contract).
179 In re Van Ness Auto Plaza, 120 B.R. at 547 (referring to Cal. Veh. Code section 11713.3 as applicable
nonbankruptcy law).
180 Id. at 547. The court considered the following factors in determining whether consent to assignment
was reasonably withheld:
(1) whether the proposed dealer has adequate working capital; (2) the extent of
prior experience of the proposed dealer; (3) whether the proposed dealer has been
profitable in the past; (4) the location of the proposed dealer; (5) the prior sales
performance of the proposed dealer; (6) the business acumen of the proposed dealer;
(7) the suitability of combining the franchise in question with other franchises at the
same location; and (8) whether the proposed dealer provides the manufacturer
sufficient information regarding its qualifications.
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the Bankruptcy Code. 18 1 The court reached this conclusion without considering
whether the contract was personal to the dealership or whether Porsche would have
been excused from accepting performance from a new dealer. Assignment was
prohibited under section 365(c)(1) simply because assignment was prohibited under
California law.
Other courts, however, have found that franchise agreements do not fall within
the scope of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code even if the assignment of
such contracts is restricted by state law,' 82 in large measure because franchise
agreements generally are not considered personal service contracts.1 83 As discussed
above, prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Braniff Airways, courts generally
considered whether the contract was one for personal services in determining
whether section 365(c)(1) applied. Although most courts have declined to limit
section 365(c)(1) to personal service contracts, a few courts have imposed this
limitation 84in the context of franchise agreements in cases decided after Braniff
Airways. 1

18' Id. at 547 ("In a well-reasoned opinion that this court finds persuasive, the First Circuit held that

section 365(c)(1) applies to state statutes restricting transfer of automobile dealership franchises.").
182 See In re James Cable Partners,L.P., 27 F.3d at 537 (finding a city ordinance prohibiting assignment
of cable franchise without city approval was a mere general prohibition of assignment and thus insufficient
to constitute applicable law under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Sunrise Rests. Inc., 135
B.R. at 153 (finding a Burger King franchise was not a personal service contract and, therefore, was
assignable); In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 134 B.R. at 679 (finding a franchise agreement was
assignable because "the franchise agreement [was] not 'a personal service contract[.]"'); In re BronxWestchester Mack, 20 B.R. at 143 (finding a distributorship agreement was not personal service contract
and, therefore, was assignable); In re Varisco, 16 B.R. at 638 (finding a franchise agreement to market and
distribute baked goods was assignable because it was not a personal service contract).
183See In re Sunrise Rests. Inc., 135 B.R. at 153:
There is hardly any question that the relationship between [the] parties was nothing
more than a strict business transaction to furnish economic gains to both contracting
parties. To run a Burger King retail establishment does not require a special knowledge
in a conventional sense, that is a special judgment, taste, skill or ability.
Id.; In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 134 B.R. at 679 ("[F]ranchise agreements are not personal
service contracts...."); In re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1011-12 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986):
The Agency Contract by its terms is not dependent upon any special personal
relationship, special knowledge, or unique skill or talent, but rather it typifies and tracks
the ordinary consensual agency, franchise, or distributorship agreements, which have
been consistently interpreted by the courts as not within the ambit or proscript of
Section 365(c)(1)(A).
Id.; In re Bronx-Westchester Mack, 20 B.R. at 143 ("[Section 365(c)(1)(A)] relates to executory contracts
that are personal in nature. A distributorship or franchise agreement which does not depend upon a special
relationship between the parties is not within the reach of this exception."); In re Varisco, 16 B.R. at 638
("[Section 365(c)(1)(A)'s] application is limited to executory contracts which are truly personal and this
[franchise agreement] is not really the type of contract involved here.").
1841n re Sunrise Rests. Inc., 135 B.R. at 153:
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bankruptcy court

considered whether a bankrupt automobile dealership could assume and assign its
franchise agreement with Chrysler. 185 Chrysler argued that, since the franchise
agreement could not be assumed absent its consent under Florida law, the franchise
agreement could not be assumed and assigned under section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

The bankruptcy court disagreed and found that the franchise

agreement could be assumed and assigned because the agreement was not a contract
for personal

services.1 86 According to the bankruptcy court, "the franchise

agreement is not 'a personal service contract based on a special trust and confidence
and on a special relationship' between the Debtor and Chrysler."' i8 7 Thus, the

bankruptcy 88
court granted the debtor's motion to assume and assign the franchise
agreement.
Given the trend of a majority of the courts to apply section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code beyond the personal services context, the continued utility of
189
cases like Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth (and its progeny) is questionable.
Nevertheless, courts that consider whether the identity of the contracting party is

material to the agreement in analyzing section 365(c)(1) may find the reasoning of
the court in Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth persuasive and may reach a similar
There is hardly any question that the relationship between the parties was nothing more
than a strict business transaction to furnish economic gains to both contracting parties
....This being the case, the objection by BKC of the Debtor's right to assume or
assign the franchise agreements and other contractual rights is without merit and must
be rejected.
Id.; In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 134 B.R. at 679 (finding that a franchise agreement was
assignable because "the franchise agreement [was] not 'a personal service contract ....');see also In re
James Cable Partners,L.P., 27 F.3d at 538:
In order to be excused from accepting performance, the City would need to point to
applicable law such as a Tennessee law that renders performance under the cable
franchise agreement nondelegable. A classic example of a contract under which
performance is nondelegable is a personal service contract. The City proffers no
Tennessee law, other than the general prohibition against assignment found in
section 12 of the Ordinance and laws validating such a prohibition, that would excuse
the City from accepting performance from a third party. Accordingly, we conclude that
applicable Tennessee law does not excuse the City from accepting performance from an
entity other than James Cable, that the § 365(c)(1) exception does not apply in this
case ....
Id.(emphasis added).
18In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-PlymouthInc., 134 B.R. at 676.
186Id. at 679.
187 Id.
188
id.
189
Although not expressly limiting the application of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to personal
service contracts, the Eleventh Circuit in In re James Cable Partnersdid cite In re Sunrise Restaurants and
In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth in finding a cable franchise agreement beyond the scope of section
365(c)(1). See In re James Cable Partners,L.P., 27 F.3d at 538 n.9 ("A number of bankruptcy courts have
concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) only applies to 'nondelegable contracts such as personal service contracts.
'Several of our sister circuits, however, have concluded that § 365(c) applies more broadly 'to contracts that
are not assignable under nonbankruptcy law."' (citations omitted)).
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result. 190
6. Expanding Application

The expansion of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code beyond traditional
"personal service" contracts creates uncertainty regarding the types of contracts that
eventually may be subject to the strictures of section 365(c)(1). Courts following
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Magness will consider whether the federal or state
law in question would excuse the nondebtor party's performance if the contract
were assigned. This approach to section 365(c)(1) echoes the reasoning employed
by bankruptcy courts that, prior to BraniffAirways, focused on whether the contract
in question involved personal services. Using an analysis that focuses on the
identity of the contracting parties and whether applicable law excuses performance
under the contract potentially opens the door for additional types of agreements to
fall within the scope of section 365(c)(1). 19 1 In fact, some courts employing this
reasoning have found that operating agreements governing limited liability
companies are subject to section 365(c)(1).192 Because state limited liability statutes
190See discussion supra Section I.D.
191The scope of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code arguably could be expanded by creative
arguments as to what is "personal" to the contracting parties. A research and development agreement, for
example, could be drafted in a manner that arguably would cause it to be characterized as a personal service
contract under state law, which could trigger the application of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code if a
party to the contract were to file for bankruptcy.
192See In re IT Group, Inc., 302 B.R. 483, 488-89 (D. Del. 2003) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision
prohibiting debtor from transferring membership rights in LLC but permitting debtor to assign bare
economic interest in LLC to a third party, subject to the other members' rights of first refusal); Broyhill v.
Deluca (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 65, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996):
Upon careful consideration, this court concludes that the operating agreement
governing D & B Countryside [L.L.C.] is an executory contract, since the object of the
agreement-the development of the Pare City Center project-has not yet been
accomplished and the parties have on-going duties and responsibilities to bring the
project to a successful conclusion. The court further concludes that the nature of those
duties and responsibilities are such as to make the contract one for personal services.
Id.; In re Daugherty Constr., Inc, 188 B.R. 607, 614 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) ("The fact that a partnership
agreement or LLC agreement constitutes an intensely personal contract is . . . irrelevant to the question of
whether the interest of the debtor in the partnership or the LLC can be 'transferred' to the debtor in
possession upon commencement of a bankruptcy case under section 541."); see also Milford Power Co. v.
PDC Milford Power, L.L.C., No. C.A. No. 506-N, 2004 WL 3088704, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2004):
[T]he Ipso Facto Clause in the Milford Power LLC Agreement is effective to the extent
that it deprived PDC of its ability to participate as a member in the governance of
Milford Power .... By contrast, under the Delaware LLC Act, the other members of
Milford Power are not excused-again, as a matter of default law-from accepting an
assignment of PDC's bare economic rights as an equity owner.
Id. But see In re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000):
[E]ither member can, without being in breach of the Operating Agreement, resign
from all his offices and committee positions and no longer actively participate in the

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 231 2005

ABI LA WREVIEW

[13:187

largely are patterned after state partnership statutes, arguments can be made in favor
of applying section 365(c)(1) to prevent a debtor from assuming or assigning its
interest in a limited liability company. 193
Moreover, many courts give no consideration to the nature of the contract and
move from the conclusion that state or federal law prohibits assignment outside of
bankruptcy to the conclusion that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
prohibits assignment in bankruptcy, notwithstanding section 365(f)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Courts that consider only whether the contract is executory and
whether nonbankruptcy law prohibits assignment outside of bankruptcy could easily
apply section 365(c)(1) to joint venture agreements, as courts have found joint
venture agreements to be executory contracts. 194 Indeed, joint ventures generally are
governed by the same rules as partnerships, 195 which arguably places joint ventures
affairs of the company. He would stand in an analogous position to the company as a
shareholder to a corporation. In the circumstances of this case, there is no executory
contract, the provisions of § 365(c) and (e) are not applicable ....
Id.
193See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 502, 6A U.L.A. 604 (1996) ("A transfer of a distributional interest
does not entitle the transferee to become or to exercise any rights of a member. A transfer entitles the
transferee to receive, to the extent transferred, only the distributions to which the transferor would be
entitled."); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/30-5 (West 2004) (stating same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 4734A-502 (Mitchie 2000) (stating same).
194Post v. Sigel & Co. (In re Sigel & Co.), 923 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The joint venture
agreement between Post and Sigel was an executory contract."); Petralex Stainless, Ltd. v. Bishop Tube Div.
of Christiana Metals (In re Petralex Stainless, Ltd.), 78 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (treating joint
venture agreement as an executory contract); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Alrich-Elec. Contracting Co., 20 B.R. 583,
586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating same).
195Lutheran Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Printing Indus. of Ill./Ind. Employee Benefit Trust, 24 F. Supp. 2d 846,
851 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Groark v. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 231 111.App. 3d 61, 66 (1st Dist. 1992)):
As a practical matter, the only distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is
that "a joint venture relates to a single enterprise or transaction while a partnership
relates to a general business of a particular kind.".... Partnership principles govern
joint ventures and the rights and liabilities of the members of a joint venture are tested
by the same legal principles which govern partnerships.
Id.; Napoli v. Domnitch, 226 N.Y.S.2d 908, 913 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962):
Since it has been said, however, that "A joint adventure is subject to exactly the same
rules as a technical partnership" ... and that "Generally speaking, the principles of the
law of partnership apply, at least by analogy" ... and since the basic elements of a
partnership, except perhaps for limitation in scope ... the court will treat the parties as
partners and determined their rights and duties under the Partnership Law ....
Id. (citations omitted); Busler v. D & H Mfg., Inc., 611 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("Essentially,
a joint venture is a partnership entered into for a single transaction or limited period of time .... Hence,
courts generally apply principles of partnership law to govern the relationship."); Milton Kauffman, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 210 P.2d 88, 94 (Cal. App. Dep't Super Ct. 1949) ("The resemblance
between a partnership and a joint venture is so close that the rights as between adventurers are governed
practically by the same rules that govern partners."); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint-Stock Companies § 3
(1994) ("Joint ventures are, in general, governed by the same rules as partnerships."); id. § 40 ("An
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within the scope of section 365(c)(1). Given the expanding application of
section 365(c)(1) beyond the assignment of executory contracts to the assumption
of executory contracts, whether a contract falls within the scope of section 365(c)(1)
has become increasingly important.
III.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT UNDER
SECTION 365(c)(1): THE HYPOTHETICAL TEST V. THE ACTUAL TEST

The expanding application of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code also has
important consequences for debtors that merely seek to assume an executory
contract or unexpired lease when applicable nonbankruptcy law restricts or
prohibits the assignment of the particular contract or lease. If a court determines
that a contract falls within the scope of section 365(c)(1), then the debtor will not be
able to assign the contract to another party even if doing so would serve to
maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. As previously illustrated, some courts
have gone further and found that, if a contract falls within the scope of
section 365(c)(1), the debtor is prohibited not only from assigning the contract to
another party but also from assuming the contract for the benefit of the reorganized
debtor.
There is a split of authority regarding whether section 365(c)(l) of the
Bankruptcy Code creates a hypothetical 96 or actual' 97 test for determining whether
assignment by one venturer of his interest in the enterprise without the consent of his coventurer is a
violation of the fiduciary relationship."). Under some statutes, a partnership is explicitly defined to include a
joint venture. See, e.g., TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 152.05 1(b) (Vernon 2004) ("[A]n association
of two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners creates a partnership, regardless of
whether: (1) the persons intend to create a partnership; or (2) the association is called a 'partnership,' 'joint
venture,' or other name.").
196 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Without RCI's consent, Sunterra was precluded from assuming the Agreement."); In re O'Connor, 258
F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Under Louisiana law, a partner cannot make a third person a member of the
partnership without his partners' consent .... Appellees did not consent to substituting the Trustee for the
Debtor. Accordingly, the district court correctly held the agreement was not assumable under § 365(c)(1).");
Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 126 n.19 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In West, we held § 365(c)(1) created a
'hypothetical test' whereby an assignment of an executory contract was invalid if precluded by applicable
law."); Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[W]e hold that, where applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an executory contract nonassignable because
the identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the contract absent
consent of the nondebtor party."); City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable
Partners, L.P.), 27 F.3d 534, 537 (1 1th Cir. 1994) ("The first condition presents a hypothetical question:
Whether under applicable law the City is excused from accepting performance from a third party, that is a
party other than James Cable as debtor or debtor in possession."); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test-i.e., under the applicable law, could the
government refuse performance from 'an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession."); Tonry v.
Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Under § 365(c) the trustee may not assume an
executory contract if, under applicable law, the non-debtor party is free to decline performance by the
trustee."); In re Neuhoff Farms, Inc., 258 B.R. 343, 350 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000) ("For the purposes of this
order, the court will apply the hypothetical test in analyzing Hatfield's contentions as to § 365(c)(1) .... ");
In re TechDyn Sys., Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) ("Because the Anti-Assignment Act
plainly prohibits assignment of the debtor's contracts with the United States Government, the debtor ... is
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a debtor can assume an executory contract or unexpired lease. Section 365(c)(1)
provides that a debtor "may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease ... if ...applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to
such contract from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an
barred by § 365(c)(1) from assuming those contracts ....
");In re Grove Rich Realty Corp., 200 B.R. 502,
510 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is well settled that when an executory contract is of such a nature as to be
based upon personal services or skills, or upon personal trust or confidence, the debtor-in-possession or
trustee is unable to assume or assign the rights of the bankrupt in such contract."); Breeden v. Catron (In re
Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 633 (E.D. Va. 1993) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision finding debtor could not
assume partnership agreement pursuant to section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code); In re Plum Run Serv.
Corp., 159 B.R. 496, 501 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) ("[Section] 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test: Under
applicable law, could the government refuse performance from an entity other than the debtor or the debtorin-possession?"); United States Dep't of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In re Carolina Parachute
Corp.), 108 B.R. 100, 103-04 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (following West Electronics lifting automatic stay); Pa. Peer
Review Org. v. United States (In re Pa. Peer Review Org.), 50 B.R. 640, 645-46 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985)
("[B]ecause the applicable statute prohibits the transfer of a government contract 'to any other party,' the
section 365(c) requirement of a general nontransferability statute is satisfied and the Bankruptcy Code itself
precludes any assumption on the contract, even where such an assumption might otherwise occur by
operation of law.").
197 See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("We rejected the
proposed hypothetical test in Leroux, holding instead that subsection 365(c) and (e) contemplate a case-bycase inquiry into whether the nondebtor party ...actually was being 'forced to accept performance under its
executory contract from someone other than the debtor party with whom it originally contracted."'); Summit
Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (Ist Cir. 1995) ("[S]ection 365(c)(1) presents no bar to [the]
assumption of the Agreement."); In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 319, 332 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) ("This
court shares the view that the Anti-Assignment Act does not prevent assumption of an agreement under
section 365(c)(1)...."); In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 230 B.R. 693, 705 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) ("The
court concludes that section 365(c) does not operate to preclude the Trustee from seeking to assume the
Supply Contracts on the basis of the reasoning set forth in West."); In re Lil' Things, Inc, 220 B.R. 583, 587
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) ("Following the lead of the Supreme Court, this Court also rejects the 'separate
entity' theory and finds that a debtor may assume its own contracts and leases if it complies with
§ 365(b)(1)."); In re GP Express Airlines, Inc, 200 B.R.222, 233 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("My conclusion
that section 365(c)(1) does not bar assumption of contracts by the debtor in possession is consistent with
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code which decline to enforce forfeiture provisions in private
contracts."); In re Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 164 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("[A] hypothetical test is
not the intent of the statute."); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 938 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994)
("Where the ... assumption.., would not change the essential identity of the entity performing the services
under the contract, the exception is not effective."); In re James Cable Partners,L.P., 154 B.R. at 815, affd,
27 F.3d 534 (1 1th Cir. 1994) ("This court agrees with the bankruptcy court and these courts and rejects the
hypothetical test."); Texaco Inc. v. a. Land & Exploration Co., 136 B.R. 658, 671 (M.D. La. 1992) ("[T]he
phrase 'applicable law' is commonly used to refer to the law applicable to the facts of the case at hand rather
than some law that may be applicable to another set of circumstances."); In re Ontario Locomotive & Indus.
Ry. Supplies, (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[T]his Court concludes ... that
Congress did not intend to bar assumption of any contract as long as it will be performed by the debtor or
debtor in possession."); In re Fastrax, Inc., 129 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]he prohibition
against a trustee's power to assume an executory contract does not apply where it is the debtor that is in
possession and the performance to be given or received under a personal service contract will be the same as
if no petition had been filed...."); In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
("[A] debtor in possession can assume a personal service contract that is nonassignable under state law as
long as its performance is going to be the same as if no petition had been filed."); In re Hartec Enters., Inc.,
117 B.R. 865, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("[T]his court concludes that this 'actual test' is a more faithful
reading of the statute, one which is both harmonious with other sections of the Code and with the Code's
purposes.").
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entity other than the debtor or debtor in possession... ."'98 Courts that have
adopted the "actual" test interpret this provision as applying only when the debtor
actually seeks to assign an executory contract or unexpired lease that cannot be
assigned under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Courts that have adopted the
"hypothetical" test interpret this provision as prohibiting the assumption of any
executory contract or unexpired lease if applicable law prohibits the assignment of
the particular contract or lease-regardless of whether the debtor actually seeks to
assign the contract or lease. Thus, under the hypothetical test, a debtor could not
assume an executory contract or unexpired lease even if applicable law permitted or
did not speak to the assumption of the particular contract or lease by the debtor.
A. The Hypothetical Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first Circuit
Court to adopt the hypothetical test.1 99 In West Electronics, the debtor sought to
assume a contract with the United States pursuant to which it supplied a substantial
number of AIM-9 missile launder supply units to the Air Force.200 The government
objected and argued that, since the Anti-Assignment Act prevented the debtor from
assigning the contract to a third party, the debtor could not assume the contract for
its own benefit. The Third Circuit agreed and found that, under section 365(c)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor could not assume the contract because the AntiAssignment Act, being "applicable nonbankruptcy law," prevented the debtor from
assigning the contract. 201
The Third Circuit justified its decision on two grounds. First, it found that the
"literal meaning of the words chosen by Congress" requires the application of a
hypothetical test (i.e., a plain language argument).2 2 Section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code does not say that a debtor "may not assume and assign" an
executory contract if applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the nondebtor party
from accepting performance from an entity other than the debtor in possession.
Rather, it says that a debtor "may not assume or assign" an executory contract if
applicable nonbankruptcy law excuses the nondebtor party from accepting
'9' 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (2000).
199In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 79.
200 Id. at 80.

20 Id. at 83:

We conclude that assignment of a contract calling for the production of military
equipment is precisely what Congress intended to prevent when it prohibited

assignments in 41 U.S.C. § 15. Thus, West could not force the government to accept
the "personal attention and services" of a third party without its consent. It therefore
necessarily follows that under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) West, as a debtor in possession,
cannot assume this contract.
Id.
202

Id. at 83 ("The literal meaning of the words chosen by Congress clearly requires the analysis and

conclusion we have just articulated and we are confident that it is what Congress intended.").
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performance from an entity other than the debtor in possession. 20 3 Second, the Third
Circuit found that "a solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession are
materially distinct entities" (i.e., a separate entity argument).2 °4 Accordingly, the
assumption of the contract by the debtor in possession constituted a constructive
assignment from the pre-petition company to the post-petition company.
The Third Circuit's plain language argument has been adopted by other courts
that have adopted the hypothetical test. 20 5 The Third Circuit's separate entity
argument, however, has been rejected by most, if not all, of these courts as being
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.2 0 6 Before the Third Circuit decided
West Electronics, the United States Supreme Court decided Bildisco & Bildisco, in
which the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a debtor in possession is
anything other than the "same 'entity' which existed before the filing of the
20311 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
204 In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 83:
We think that by including the words "or the debtor in possession" in 11 U.S.C. §
365(c)(1) Congress anticipated an argument like the one here made and wanted that
section to reflect its judgment that in the context of the assumption and assignment of
executory contracts, a solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession going
through bankruptcy are materially distinct entities.
Id.
205 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 2004) ("By its plain language, § 365(c)(1) addresses
both assumption and assignment."); Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d
747, 753 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he plain language of § 365(c)(1) compels the result Perlman urges: Catapult
may not assume the Perlman licenses over Perlman's objection."); In re Neuhoff Farms, Inc., 258 B.R. 343,
350 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000) ("The literal language of § 365(c)(1) is... said to establish a 'hypothetical test':
a debtor in possession may not assume an executory contract over the nondebtor's objection if applicable law
would bar assignment to a hypothetical party ....
");In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he remaining text of§ 365(c)(1) unmistakably makes it clear that the debtor may neither
assume nor assign the contracts without the government's consent.").
206See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 614 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[P]ertinent Supreme
Court
decisions diminish the legal 'fiction' that the prepetition debtor and the postpetition debtor are to be treated as
though they were separate legal entities ....
");In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 230 B.R. 693, 705 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1999) (rejecting separate entity theory); In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1998) ("This view is consistent with the one expressed by the Supreme Court ...that a debtor in
possession is a new entity separate and distinct from its pre-bankruptcy persona unrealistic when reconciling
conflicting provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and the Bankruptcy Code."); In re GP Express
Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("[T]here is no meaningful distinction between GP
Express and GP Express debtor in possession."); In re Daugherty Constr., Inc., 188 B.R. 607, 613 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1995) ("The Supreme Court rejected the distinction between debtor and Chapter 11 debtor in
possession ....); Texaco Inc. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 136 B.R. 658, 669 (M.D. La. 1992) ("[T]he
Supreme Court squarely held that a debtor in possession is the same 'entity' as the prepetition debtor."); In re
Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) ("[T]he postpetition debtor in Chapter 11 is
not a different legal entity from its prepetition entity."); see also Perlman v. Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re
Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754 n.9 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We emphasize that our holding today is based
on the plain language of the statute, and does not rely on the 'separate entity' theory touched on in In re W.
Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 83, and subsequently [sic] discredited in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco ....
");In re
TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. at 862 ("It is true that the 'separate entity' theory is not without its problems in
the context of § 365(c)(1), but neither West nor Catron is wholly dependent on a separate entity analysis and
both courts rely on other considerations as well.").
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bankruptcy petition., 20 7 If a debtor in possession were a new entity, it would be
unnecessary for a debtor in possession to reject formally any executory contract or
unexpired leases because the debtor in possession, being a new entity, would not be
bound by the terms of the contracts or leases. 20 8 The separate entity theory thus
would render meaningless those provisions in the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the
rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases since a bankruptcy filing itself
would have the effect of rejecting all executory contracts. 20 9 Accordingly, courts
that have followed West Electronics generally do so because they believe that the
plain language of section 365(c)(1) necessitates the application of the hypothetical
test and not because they view a debtor in possession as a new or separate entity.2 10
B. The Actual Test
Under the actual test, a debtor can assume an executory contract or unexpired
lease even if the debtor cannot assign the particular contract or lease to a third
party.2 11 The debtor must still cure any existing monetary defaults under the terms
207NLRB

v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984):

For our purposes, it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as the same "entity"
which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of
the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it could not
have employed absent the bankruptcy filing.
Id.
'I' Id. ("Obviously if the [debtor in possession] were a wholly 'new entity,' it would be unnecessary for the
Bankruptcy Code to allow it to reject executory contracts, since it would not be bound by such contracts in
the first place.").
209See In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 230 B.R. at 705 ("If the court were to adopt
the rationale of West
and focus primarily upon assignability, a chapter 11 filing would have the virtual effect of rejecting
executory contracts covered by section 365(f).").
210 See Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 267 ("By its plain language, § 365(c)(1) addresses both assumption and
assignment."); In re CatapultEntm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 753 ("[T]he plain language of § 365(c)(1) compels the
result that Perlman urges: Catapult may not assume the Perlman licenses over Perlman's objection."); In re
Neuhoff Farms, Inc., 258 B.R. at 350 ("The literal language of § 365(c)(1) is... said to establish a
'hypothetical test': a debtor in possession may not assume an executory contract over the nondebtor's
objection if applicable law would bar assignment to a hypothetical party ....
(quoting In re Catapult
Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d at 750)); In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. at 861 ("[T]he remaining text of §
365(c)(1) unmistakably makes it clear that the debtor may neither assume nor assign the contracts without
the government's consent."). But see In re Plum Run Serv. Corp, 159 B.R. 495, 501 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993)
("However, case law clearly notes the distinction between a pre-petition debtor and the debtor-in-possession.
To allow a debtor-in-possession to assume a contract, in essence, creates an assignment of the contract from
the pre-petition debtor to the debtor-in-possession.").
21 See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding
section
365(c) and section 365(e) contemplate case-specific inquiry into whether non-debtor party was forced to
accept performance under executory contract from third party. (quoting Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d
at 612)); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 ("[S]ection 365(c) presents no bar to [the] assumption of
the Agreement."); In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 319, 332 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (stating Anti-Assignment
Act does not prevent assumption of agreement under statute); In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 230 B.R. at
705 ("The court concludes that section 365(c) does not operate to preclude the Trustee from seeking to
assume the Supply Contracts on the basis of the reasoning set forth in West."); In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 237 2005

ABILA WREVIEW

[13:187

of the executory contract or unexpired lease prior to assumption, 12 but
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code does not serve as an obstacle to
assumption under the actual test when no assignment is actually contemplated.
Courts that have adopted the actual test have posited various reasons why the actual
test presents a better interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code than the hypothetical
test.
First, courts have found that the actual test is compatible with the literal
language of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.213 Section 365(c)(1) gives
effect to applicable nonbankruptcy law that restricts or conditions assignment
outside of bankruptcy. The assumption of an executory contract or unexpired lease
does not effect an assignment, as so defined outside of bankruptcy, because the
debtor in possession is not a new or separate entity.21 4 Thus, if nonbankruptcy law is
B.R. at 587 (stating "debtor may assume its own contracts and leases if it complies with § 365(b)(1)."); In re
GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. at 233 (explaining section 365(c)(1) does not bar assumption of
contracts by debtor in possession); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 938 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1994) (stating where assumption would not alter "essential identity" of entity performing services under
contract, exception is not effective (quoting In re CardinalIndus., Inc., 116 B.R. at 982)); In re Am. Ship
Bldg. Co., 164 B.R. 358, 362-63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (reading statute in conjunction with applicable
law, including the Non-Assignment Act, to prevent Debtor from assigning contract without approval); City
of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 154 B.R. 813, 815 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1993) (positing because rights are acquired without assignment from the debtor to the debtor in
possession, it makes no sense to prohibit debtor in possession from 'assuming' executory contract); In re
Ontario Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies, 126 BR. 145, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding
"Congress did not intend to bar assumption of any contract as long as it will be performed by the debtor or
debtor in possession."); In re Fastrax, Inc., 129 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding prohibition
against trustee's power to assume executory contract does not apply where debtor is in possession under
personal service contract (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b) (1980))); In re Hartec
Enters., Inc., 117 B.R. 865, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (deciding "actual" test fulfills purposes of antiassignment statutes); In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 979 ("[A] debtor in possession can assume
nonassignable personal service contract under state law as long as performance is going to be same as if no
petition had been filed.").
212See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2000); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 208 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating
debtor must cure all existing defaults owed to non-debtor party); In re Res. Tech. Corp., 254 B.R. 215, 221
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (explaining debtor must cure all defaults before assigning to debtor in possession).
213 See Summit In,. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 612 (finding it plausible to construe statute as requiring
actual showing prior to termination of debtor's post-petition contract rights that nondebtor party would not be
forced to accept performance under its executory contract from someone other than debtor party with whom
it originally contracted); Texaco v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 136 BR. 658, 671 (M.D. La. 1992)
(allowing proposed assumption of lease, on basis that phrase "applicable law" is commonly used to refer to
law applicable to the facts of case at hand); In re Hartec Enters. Inc., 117 B.R. at 872 (concluding "actual
test is a more faithful reading of the statute, one which is both harmonious with other sections of the Code
and with the Code's purpose.").
214See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 614 (determining Supreme Court decisions diminish the legal
"fiction" that pre-petition debtor and post-petition debtor are to be treated as separate legal entities); In re
Cajun Elec. Power Coop., 230 B.R. at 705 (stating most courts have rejected separate entity theory (quoting
In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. at 586)); In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. at 587 ("[[]t is sensible to view the
debtor-in-possession as the same 'entity' which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but
empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and property in the same manner it
could not have done absent the bankruptcy filing." (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
528 (1984))); In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. at 232 (discerning no meaningful distinction between
GP Express and GP Express debtor in possession); In re James Cable Partners,L.P., 154 B.R. at 815-16

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 238 2005

2005]

DEBTORS BEWARE

not applicable because no assignment is actually contemplated, then it arguably
makes little sense to give effect to such anti-assignment law in bankruptcy when a
debtor does not seek to assign a contract. Under this interpretation, the term
"applicable law" in section 365(c)(1) refers only to law that actually applies to the
actions that the debtor wishes to take.
Moreover, the hypothetical test arguably renders the words "or assign" in
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code mere surplusage. 215 As previously stated,
assumption is a prerequisite to assignment. A contract cannot be assigned unless it
is first assumed in accordance with section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, if section 365(c)(1) applies to the assumption and assignment of
executory contracts, it does not need to include the words "or assign." It would be
sufficient for the clause to say that the trustee may not assume any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor if applicable law excuses the nondebtor
party from rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor in possession.
Advocates of both the hypothetical test and the actual test have difficulty
making sense of Congress' use of the phrase "assume or assign" in section 365(c)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code. Given the split in the courts on this issue, the plain
language of section 365(c)(1) cannot provide the basis for resolving the controversy
regarding the application of this section when the debtor merely seeks to assume an
executory contract or unexpired lease. As stated above, the hypothetical test
renders the words "or assume" mere surplusage, while the actual test transforms the
phrase "assume or assign" into "assume and assign." Both tests are thus arguably
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
Second, courts have found that the actual test is more consistent with the
legislative history of section 365(c)(1). 2 16 Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
initially was enacted as a part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.217
Section 365(c)(1) originally provided that the trustee could not "assume or assign an
(finding it makes no sense to prohibit the debtor in possession from assuming executory contract); Texaco,
136 B.R. at 670 (stating separate entity reasoning is directly contrary to Bildisco); In re Ontario Locomotive,
126 B.R. at 148 ("Congress did not intend to bar assumption of any contract as long as it will be performed
by the debtor or debtor in possession."); In re Fastrax Inc., 129 B.R. at 277 (rejecting proposition that
debtor-in-possession is a different legal entity from a debtor); In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 981
(holding post-petition debtor is not different legal entity from its pre-petition entity); In re Hartec Enters.,
Inc., 117 B.R. at 871 n.10 (stating debtor and debtor in possession are functionally same entity).
215See In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 977 ("[t]f non-assignability of a contract is sufficient
as a
matter of law to preclude assumption by the trustee, then there was no reason for Congress to provide that
the trustee 'may not assume or assign' such contracts."); In re Hartec Enters., 117 B.R. at 870 n.6
(interpreting section 365(c) in light of section 365(f)).
116 In re Nizny, 175 B.R. at 937 (stating H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 27(b) (1980) indicates
Congress did not intend section 365(c)(1) to preclude assumption of an otherwise nonassignable personal
service contract if performance to be given or received "will be the same as if no petition had been filed.")
(quoting In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 979); In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 979 (finding no
Congressional intent to preclude assumption); see also In re Supernatural Foods, L.L.C., 268 B.R. 759, 773
(Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (stating Congress intended to grant new rights to debtor in enacting section 365).
217Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 365(c), 92 Stat.
2549, 2575 (1978) (11 U.S.C. §
365(c) (1983)) (prior to 1984 and 1986 amendments); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 (detailing
past language of section 365(c)).
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executory contract" if "applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the
trustee.., whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of
rights or delegation of duties .... ,8 The legislative history indicates that
"[s]ubsection (c)... only applies in the situation in which applicable law excuses
independent of any restrictive language in the
the other party from performance
2 19
contract or lease itself.,
Congress subsequently amended section 365(c)(1) as a part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,220 which changed the language of
section 365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that the trustee could not
"assume or assign an executory contract" if "applicable bankruptcy law excuses a
party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance
from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession ... whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties ... .,,221 There is no authoritative
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984. Courts, however, have looked to the legislative history of the Technical
Amendments Act of 1980, which sought to make minor changes to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, for guidance.222 Indeed, the language of a House amendment
218Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 365(c); see Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 (explaining
difference between old and revised statute).
219 S. REP. No. 95-598, at 59 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4717, 5845.
220Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362, 98 Stat. 333,

362 (1984) (prior to 1986 amendment) [hereinafter BAFJA 1984] (amending bankruptcy executory contract
and lease provisions); see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.LH[2][a] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th
ed. rev. 1997) (explaining section 365 1984 amendments); see also Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at
613 (finding Congress intended section 365 1984 amendment to clarify assumption power in executory
contract situation where debtor continues to perform contract as debtor in possession).
Section 365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code was amended again in 1986. The 1986 amendment
merely struck out "or an assignee of such contract or lease," and did not make any changes that could be
considered helpful to resolving the conflict as to whether section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a
hypothetical or an actual test. See Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees, & Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 283(e)(1), 100 Stat. 3088, 3117 (1986) (correcting technically title 11); 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.LH[2][b] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (reviewing
section 365 1986 amendments).
221 BAFJA 1984, supra note 220 (emphasis added); see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.LH[2][a]
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (explaining section 365 1984 amendments); Summit Inv. &
Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 (finding congress intended section 365 1984 amendment to clarify trustee's
assumption power in executory contract situation where debtor in possession, performance same as if no
petition filed due to personal nature of contract).
222See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 (finding H.R. Rep. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §
27(b) (1980) persuasive in rejecting hypothetical test); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 937
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating H.R. Rep. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b) (1980) "clearly
indicates" congressional intent against preclusion of nonassignable personal contract assumption if
performance same as if no petition filed); In re Fastrax, 129 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding
section 365(c)(1) designed only to prevent debtor-in-possession executory contract assignment where
nonassignable by law); In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding
section 365(c)(1) provides debtor-in-possession can assume personal service contract nonassignable under
state law as long as performance same as if no petition filed). But see In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257,
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to the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 eventually was adopted (in part) by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 as the amended
version of section 365(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.223
The legislative history of the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 indicates:
This amendment makes clear that the prohibition against a trustee's
power to assume an executory contract does not apply where it is
the debtor that is in possession and the performance to be given or
received under a personal service contract will be the same as if no
petition had been filed because of the personal service nature of the
contract.224
Courts adopting the actual test view this statement as evidence that Congress did
not intend to adopt the hypothetical test or the reasoning behind it when Congress
amended section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in 1984.225 The changes made
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, however,
failed to change the words "assume or assign" in section 365(c)(1) to "assume and
assign."
270 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b) (1980) inconclusive); Perlman v.
Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding H.R. 1195,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b) (1980) not dispositive).
223The House proposed the following changes to section 365(c)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code:
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or
lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to [the trustee] an
entity other than the debtor in possession or an assignee of such contract or lease by
virtue of the nature of such contract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties ....
H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. § 27 (b) at 57 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Report]. The language "by
virtue of the nature of such contract or lease" was not adopted by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984; however, the language "an entity other than the debtor in possession" was so
adopted. See BAFJA 1984, supra note 220. For this reason, it is arguably appropriate to consider the
legislative history behind the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 in light of the absence of such history
behind the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. See In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116
B.R. at 979 ("[W]hile The Technical Amendments Act was originally drafted by the Senate, it was the
language of the House amendment to the Act that eventually was adopted by BAFJA in 1984."); see also
Bankruptcy Court And Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, S. REP. No. 98-55, § 552(a) (1983) (revealing Senate
approval of House amendment); Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. REP. No. 98-65, §
252(a) (1983) (revealing Senate approval of House amendment).
224 1980 Report, supra note 223.
225 See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 (finding 1980 Report persuasive in rejecting the
hypothetical test); In re Nizny, 175 B.R. at 937 (interpreting 1980 Report as clearly indicative of
congressional intent against preclusion of assumption of nonassignable personal service contract if
performance same as if no petition filed); In re Fastrax, 129 B.R. at 278 (finding section 365(c)(1) designed
only to prevent debtor-in-possession executory contract assignment where nonassignable by law); In re
CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 979 (finding section 365(c)(1) provides debtor-in-possession can assume
personal service contract nonassignable under state law as long as performance same as if no petition filed).
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Third, courts have found that the actual test is more compatible with the goal of
maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate. 6 If the ultimate goal of bankruptcy
is the rehabilitation of a debtor's business, it makes little sense to prevent a debtor
from assuming a potentially valuable asset. 7 Given the nature and number of
contracts that courts have found to fall within the scope of section 365(c)(1), a
court's decision to adopt either the actual or hypothetical test undoubtedly impacts
the ability of a debtor to reorganize effectively. 228 Courts that (1) do not consider
the nature of the contract or whether the identity of the original contracting party is
material and (2) apply the hypothetical test are likely to apply section 365(c)(1) to
prevent assumption whenever the contract in question is executory and there is
some state or federal law that restricts assignment outside of bankruptcy, often to a
debtor's estate's detriment.
226See Texaco Inc. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 136 BR. 658, 671 (M.D. La. 1992) ("The proposition
tends to defeat the basic bankruptcy purpose of enhancement of the bankruptcy estate for benefit of
rehabilitation and the general creditors upon a highly technical 'hypothetical' test which furthers no
bankruptcy purpose at all."); In re CardinalIndus. Inc., 116 B.R. at 981 ("If the ultimate goal of Chapter 11
is the rehabilitation of a debtor's enterprise, the Trustee questions the wisdom of preventing the estate from
assuming an executory contract which potentially is its most valuable asset, solely because the contract
cannot be assigned to a hypothetical third party."); see also In re TechDyn Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 864
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999) ("The court is sympathetic with such concerns and recognizes that a blanket refusal
to permit a reorganizing debtor to assume valuable Government contracts over the Government's objection
may well represent poor bankruptcy policy.").
7 SeeNLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1983) ("The fundamental purpose of
reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible
misuse of economic resources."); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery,
330 F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The premise of a reorganization is to ensure that the debtor emerges from
bankruptcy as a viable concern."); In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The paramount
objective of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to rehabilitate and preserve the value of the financially distressed
business."); In re Cedar Shore Resort, Inc., 235 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding purpose of chapter 11
reorganization "'is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide employees
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders."') (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595 (1975),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6179); In re Casse, 198 F.3d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding "object
[of chapter 11] is to permit a potentially viable debtor to restructure and emerge from bankruptcy
protection.") (citing Kings Terrace Nursing Home & Health Related Facility v. N.Y. State Dep't of Social
Servs. (In re Kings Terrace Nursing Home and Health Related Facility), 184 B.R. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1995)); Canadian Pac. Forest Prods. Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson Group, Inc.), 66 F.3d 1436, 1442
(6th Cir. 1995) (stating chapter 11 purpose to provide debtor legal protection for reorganization, in turn
providing creditors "going-concern value" rather than possibility of "more meager satisfaction through
liquidation.").
28 To avoid the consequences of the hypothetical test, at least one bankruptcy court has found that
nonassumable executory contracts can "ride-through" bankruptcy if they are intentionally not assumed and
not rejected when the contract is of significant important to the debtor's reorganization. See In re Hernandez,
287 B.R. 795, 806-07 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (finding nonassumable exclusive patent license could "ridethrough" bankruptcy over licensor's motion to compel under section 365(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
because requiring the debtor to reject the license would significantly harm the debtor's attempted
reorganization). Nevertheless, even if adopted by other courts, this approach is unlikely to be useful to
debtors in hypothetical jurisdictions because, under the "ride-through" doctrine, the benefits afforded by
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, such as insulation from ipso facto provisions and the ability to cure
arrearages, are inapplicable. See id. 287 B.R. at 800 ("A contract that is not assumed is not entitled to the
benefits afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 365 such as insulation from ipso facto provisions or the rights to cure
arrearages within a reasonable period of time ....
").
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IV.

THE RIGHTS OF NONDEBTOR PARTIES TO

SECTION 365(c)(1) CONTRACTS AND LEASES

A debtor's potential inability to assume an executory contract or unexpired lease
draws into question the rights of nondebtor parties to contracts and leases that are
subject to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, a nondebtor
party may desire to terminate the contract or lease upon the discovery of the
debtor's bankruptcy, or the nondebtor party may seek to enforce a clause that
provides for the termination of the contractual relationship upon the debtor's
insolvency or filing for bankruptcy. A nondebtor party's ability to terminate an
otherwise non-assumable contract or lease may be restricted or affected by the
automatic stay imposed in a debtor's bankruptcy case under section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts
also may be unwilling to enforce an ipso facto clause (e.g., a clause permitting
termination upon the debtor's insolvency or bankruptcy) even if the contract or lease
cannot be assumed under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly,
nondebtor parties must consider the extent to which various provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code other than section 365(c)(1) affect their rights under executory
contracts or unexpired leases.
A. Relieffrom the Automatic Stay
At least one court has found that debtors can continue to exercise their rights
under executory contracts or unexpired leases during the pendency of the case even
when the contracts or leases in question cannot be assumed under section 365(c)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 229 The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy
Code creates an estate consisting of all of the property identified in section 541(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.23 ° Section 541(a) defines "property of the estate" broadly
as including "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the

229See In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 137 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (opining debtor-in-possession
exercise of rights under non-assumable contract during pendency of case does not conflict with federal law
prohibiting assignment of non-exclusive licenses since debtor not assigning license to debtor-in-possession).
But see Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding "contingent fee contracts
form no part of the . .. bankruptcy estate" where such contracts cannot be assumed because of section
365(c)(1)); Spenciner v. Gettinger Assocs. (In re Brooklyn Overall Co.), 57 B.R. 999, 1002 n.2 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (commenting filing of petition does divest estate of personal service contracts which cannot
be assumed by trustee under section 365(c)); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding "[w]here an executory contract between the debtor and another is of such a nature as to be based
upon the debtor's personal skill, the trustee does not take title to the debtor's rights and cannot deal with the
contract.").
230Section 541 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part: "The commencement of a case under
section 301, 302 or 303 of this title creates an estate." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000); see 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 541.04 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (annotating section 541(a)); 11
U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (providing for commencement of voluntary case, joint case, involuntary case,
respectively).

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 243 2005

ABI LA WREVIEW

[13:187

commencement of the case." 2 3' A debtor's interest in an unassumed executory
contract or unexpired lease generally is considered property of the debtor's estate
under section 541(a).232 Accordingly, although not adopted by all courts, an
argument exists that a debtor in bankruptcy retains its rights under an executory
contract or unexpired lease even if the contract or lease cannot be assumed by the
debtor or trustee.
In Valley Media, the debtor, a full-line supplier of entertainment software
products (primarily CDs, DVDs and VHS tapes), filed a motion to sell its inventory
at an auction. 23 3 Various vendors that provided goods to the debtor under the terms
of certain distribution agreements, which gave the debtor the authority to distribute
the software products, objected to the proposed auction, asserting, among other
things, that their distribution agreements with Valley Media contained nonexclusive
licenses that could not be assumed or assigned pursuant to section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code and controlling Third Circuit precedent. Since the nonexclusive
licenses could not be assumed, the vendors reasoned that the contracts terminated
231Section

541 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part:

(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a); see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) ("Both the
congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations and Congress' choice of methods to protect secured
creditors suggest that Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate."); 5 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 541.04 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997) (commenting on broadness of
section 541 (a)).
232 See Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding executory contracts,
leases, fall under section 541(a)(1) definition); In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 302 n.12 (3d Cir.
2000) (validating leasehold interest as property interest under state law, encompassed by section 541);
Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communications, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 730
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding 11 U.S.C. § 541 plainly states "contract" is within definition of section 54 1(a)
"property of the estate."); 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc. (In re 48th St. Steakhouse,
Inc.), 835 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The courts are in agreement that unexpired leasehold interests,
including subleases, constitute property of the bankrupt estate."); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 137
(concluding licenses are executory contracts, debtor license rights vested in debtor- in-possession as of
petition date); In re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37, 41 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (stating its
"inclination" was executory contracts were property of estate); In re GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 222,
232 (finding property of bankruptcy estate includes debtor's contractual rights under section 541); In re
Daugherty Constr., Inc., 188 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995) (finding debtor's interest in limited
liability companies (L.L.C.s), rights under LLC contracts, constitute property of bankruptcy estate under
section 541); In re Chateauguay Corp., 116 B.R. 887, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Contractual rights are
intangible property which is included within the definition of the estate'of the debtor."); In re THW Enters.,
Inc., 89 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating "a lease not yet assumed is property protected by the
automatic stay from any direct or indirect act which will interfere with the debtor's interest."); In re Priestley,
93 B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (finding limited partnership interests are estate property); Varisco v.
Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634, 637 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (finding right created by
franchise agreement property of estate under section 541).
233In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. at 144 (describing debtor's business).
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upon the commencement of the debtor's case. Accordingly, the vendors argued that
the auction would constitute a first sale in violation of federal copyright law and
give rise to actions for infringement if allowed by the bankruptcy court.2 34
The bankruptcy court disagreed and found that the debtor's rights under the
distribution agreements did not terminate upon the commencement of the case but
vested in the debtor and could be exercised by the debtor during the pendency of the
bankruptcy.235 The bankruptcy court first acknowledged that "[a] nonexclusive
license of rights by a copyright owner to another party is not assignable by that
party without the permission of the copyright holder under federal common law
since the license represents only a personal and not a property interest in the
copyright., 236 The distribution agreements contained such nonexclusive licenses in
that they gave the debtor the right to sell CDs, DVDs and VHS tapes without
becoming an infringer.2 37 Accordingly, under the Third Circuit's decision in West
Electronics and section 365(c)(1), the debtor could not assume the distribution
agreements. 238 The debtor, however, was "not seeking to either assume the licenses
for the benefit of the post bankruptcy reorganized company or to assume and assign
(i.e., sell) the licenses for the benefit of the estate." 239 The debtor merely was
seeking to exercise the rights it held under the distribution agreements to sell the
goods as of the petition date. Thus, the debtor was permitted to exercise rights
under the distribution agreements during the bankruptcy even though it could not
assume the distribution agreements under West Electronics.
Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, if the debtor is viewed as
retaining its rights under an executory contract or unexpired lease during the
bankruptcy even if such rights cannot be assumed, then the nondebtor party must
first obtain relief from the automatic stay before it attempts to extinguish the
debtor's contractual rights. 240 Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for

234 Id. 133-34 (outlining vendors arguments).
235Id. at 137 ("Licenses are generally considered to be executory contracts and thus the rights of the debtor

under such licenses are vested in the debtor in possession as of the petition date.").
236 See id. at 135.
2317Id. at 139 ("[T]he Debtor in Possession is not seeking to exercise any right that it did not already
possess as of the commencement of the case and is not seeking to obtain additional performance from the
Objecting Vendors.").
8 See id. at 137 ("The debtor and the debtor in possession are indeed considered to be different entities. In
re239
W Electronics,Inc., 852 F.2d at 83 .....
Id. at 139.
240 See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communications,
Inc.), 824 F.2d
725, 730 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding even if section 365(e)(2) allowed contract termination, section 362
automatically stayed termination); In re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R:at 137 ("The automatic stay prevented
the Objecting Vendors from terminating the agreements post-petition, despite any post-petition breach,
without first seeking relief from the stay."); Alert Holdings, Inc. v. Interstate Protective Servs., Inc. (In re
Alert Holdings, Inc.), 148 B.R. 194, 202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting courts consider executory contracts
property of estate reaching the automatic stay); In re THW Enters. Inc., 89 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("[A] lease not yet assumed is property protected by the automatic stay from any direct or indirect act
which will interfere with the debtor's interest.") (citing 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc.
(In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987)); cf In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 84
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an automatic stay of, among other things, any act to obtain possession of property of

the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.24' If a debtor's interest in an unassumed executory contract or
unexpired lease is considered property of the debtor's estate under section 541(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, then an unauthorized attempt to terminate a debtor's rights
arising under the contract or lease would violate the automatic stay. If a court takes
this view, a nondebtor party must file a motion for relief from the automatic stay
with the bankruptcy court before attempting to extinguish the debtor's rights under a

non-assumable executory contract.
Contrary to the holding in Valley Media, however, some courts have found that
the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically divests a debtor of its rights under

an executory contract if that contract would be subject to section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.242 Although most courts view a debtor's legal and equitable rights

under an executory contract or unexpired lease as of the commencement of the case
as constituting property of the estate under section 541(a)(1), some courts have
stated that such rights do not become part of the estate until the debtor assumes the
contract or lease. 43 This characterization of a debtor's rights under an executory
contract prior to assumption has been widely criticized. 2 " Nevertheless, under the
(reversing judgment of district court remanding with instructions "lift stay imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
362 as relating to the [government contracts].").
24111 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2000).
242See Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding contingent fee contracts
cannot be assumed under section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code); Speciner v. Gettinger Assocs. (In re
Brooklyn Overall Co.), 57 B.R. 999, 1002 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The filing of the petition does
divest the estate of those contracts which, pursuant to § 365(c), cannot be assumed by the trustee, e.g.,
certain personal service contracts."); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting
trustee cannot take title of debtor's rights where executory contract is based upon debtor's personal skill).
243 See Otto Preminger Films, Ltd v. Qintex Entm't, Inc. (In re Qintex Entm't,
Inc.), 950 F.2d 1492, 1495
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting executory contract does not become asset until assumed); Turner v. Avery, 947 F.2d
772, 774 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating executory contract becomes part of bankruptcy estate when trustee assumes
contract); Chbat v. Tleel (In re Tleel), 876 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Unless rights under executory
contract are timely and affirmatively assumed by the trustee, they do not become property of the debtor's
estate."); Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Assoc. (In re Lovitt), 757 F.2d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1985)
(distinguishing executory contracts from other assets vesting on date trustee files bankruptcy petition); In re
Tonry, 724 F.2d at 469 (stating interest in executory contract does not vest when bankruptcy petition is
filed).
244See Pub. Serv. Co. ofN.H. v. N.H. Elec. Coop. (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 884
F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.
1989) (stating during post-petition and pre-assumption or rejection, "the executory contract remains in effect
and creditors are bound to honor it."); In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d at 730 ("The version
of 11 U.S.C. § 541 in effect at the time plainly stated that a contract comes within the definition of'property
of the estate' despite non-assignability or the existence of a bankruptcy default clause."); In re Nat'l Steel
Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (observing many courts holding property under section 541
includes executory contracts); In re ?Airant Corp., 303 B.R. 319, 328 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting
overwhelming authority holding debtor must perform under contract before deciding to assume or reject); In
re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37, 42 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (reasoning executory contracts property
of estate consonant with definition set out in section 541); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
(In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[Tlhe plain
language of § 541 sweeps in every kind of prepetition interest of the debtor in property not expressly
excepted. Nothing in the Code suggests that some kinds of interests lurk in limbo outside the estate until
assumed."); Douglas W. Bordewieck, The Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an
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reasoning of these courts, and given the interaction between sections 541(a)(1)
and 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, it is possible in some jurisdictions that the
nondebtor party would not need to seek relief from the automatic stay before
ceasing performance under a non-assumable contract.245 Because more recent and
arguably well-reasoned authority has rejected this position,24 6 a nondebtor party
should proceed cautiously and may be ill advised to proceed as if the bankruptcy
filing automatically divested the debtor of its rights under a non-assumable contract.
B. Ipso Facto Clauses
It is not uncommon for contracts or leases to contain provisions providing for
the termination of the contract or lease in the event of the insolvency or weakening
financial condition of one of the parties. These provisions generally are referred to
as "ipsofacto" clauses.247 Section 541(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
debtor's estate includes an interest of the debtor in property "notwithstanding any
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest ... or (B) that is conditioned

on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor .. ,,248 Accordingly, a
Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 200 n.18 (1985) (stating conclusion that executory contract
does not become part of estate upon commencement of case "cannot easily be squared with § 541 (a).").
245 See Fintel v.Oregon (In re Fintel), l0 B.R.50, 51 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (noting section 362(a) does not
stay actions against property that is not part of estate); Varisco v. Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 B.R.
634, 637 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981):
[W]hether or not the right granted by the Agreement is 'property of the Debtor's estate'
under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code is a threshold question. This is so because if it is
not, the automatic stay provisions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code furnish no
protection and no aid to the Debtor.
Id.; Diamond Hill Inv. Co. v. Shelden, 767 P.2d 1005, 1015 (Wyo. 1989) (automatic stay provisions apply to
proceedings or acts against the property of estate but do not apply to acts against property which is neither
the debtor's nor the estates).
246 See cases cited supra note 244; see also Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. (In re
Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 859-60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that a nondebtor could not terminate a non-assumable surety bond without first obtaining relief from automatic stay);
In re Coast Trading Co., 26 B.R. 737, 740-41 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982) (finding that non-debtor seeking
termination of executory contract had to first seek relief from automatic stay pursuant to section 362).
247 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2000); see also Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc., 307 BR. 849, 858
(N.D. Tex.
2002) (defining ipsofacto clause as one that terminates debtor's rights in executory contract upon filing for
bankruptcy); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ipso facto clause as "[a]contract
clause that specifies the consequences of a party's bankruptcy.").
248 Section 541 (c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides:
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor
in property becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(5) of
this section notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or
applicable nonbankruptcy law (A) the restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or taking possession
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debtor's interest in an executory contract or unexpired lease becomes property of the
debtor's estate notwithstanding an ipsofacto clause in the agreement to the contrary.
Section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code also makes ipso facto clauses
unenforceable in bankruptcy. Section 365(e)(1) provides that, "at any time after the
commencement of the case," a debtor's rights under an executory contract or
unexpired lease "may not be terminated or modified" by a provision in such
contract or lease or in "applicable law" that is conditioned on "(A) the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor ... (B) the commencement of a case ... or (C) the
' 49
appointment of... a trustee ... before such commencement."1
Thus, section
365(e)(1) facially pre-empts contractual and statutory ipsofacto provisions.
Section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, however, provides that the
invalidation of ipsofacto clauses does not apply to a contract or lease if "applicable
law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting
performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or to an assignee of such
contract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties[.] ' '250 Thus, section 365(e)(2) of the

by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian before such commencement, and
that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the
debtor's interest in property.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1).
249Section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(e)(1) Notwithstandinga provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in
applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be
terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may
not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely
because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on (A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a
custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (emphasis added).
250 Section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease
from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee or to an
assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and (ii) such party does not
consent to such assumption or assignment; or
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
financial accommodation, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the

debtor.
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Bankruptcy Code permits the enforcement of ipso facto clauses with respect to
contracts or leases that, under section 365(c)(1), are not subject to assumption or
assignment.
The language of section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code closely tracks the
language of section 365(c)(1). Thus, as a practical matter, to determine whether an
ipsofacto clause is enforceable under section 365(e)(2), a party must first determine
whether the contract or lease falls within section 365(c)(1). As discussed above,
this determination largely will depend upon the type of contract or lease and
whether the particular court applies the hypothetical or actual test. Indeed, the same
split of authority regarding the hypothetical 25' and actual 252 tests that exists in the
context of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code also exists in the context of
Id. § 365(e)(2) (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 did not
make any changes to the language of section 365(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the legislative
history behind the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 arguably is not directly applicable to the conflict
between sections 365(e)(1) and 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Calvin v. Siegal (In re Siegal), 190
B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996) (remarking it was unclear what significance, if any, Congress attached
to amending section 365(c)(1) but leaving section 365(e)(2) unchanged). The First Circuit, however, has
found the legislative history behind the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 applicable given the interrelated
concerns addressed by sections 365(c)(1) and 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Summit Inv. & Dev.
Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Congress contemplated in 1984 that section 365(e)(2)
would permit a debtor or a debtor in possession to avoid automatic termination of his executory contract
rights under the section 365(e)(2)(A) exemption.").
251 See Breeden v. Catron (In re Catron), 158 B.R. 629, 639
(E.D. Va. 1993):
[T]he court underscores that the language of the § 365(e)(2)(A)(i) exception tracks
almost verbatim the language found in § 365(c)(1)(A). For this reason, the analysis
used to dispose of appellant's argument with respect to § 365(c) applies with equal
force to appellant's § 365(e) argument. Thus, the court finds that the Partnership
Agreement comes within the exception recited in § 365(e)(2)(A) ....
Id.; In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987) ("[S]ection 365(e) does not apply to
the partnership agreement and the Debtor-in-Possession is not entitled to assign or assume the partnership
contract."); see also Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) ("It is obvious
that the Trustee cannot assume the position of general partner of these limited partnerships, since he is not
the person with whom the limited partners contracted. Thus, the partnerships dissolved when the Trustee was

appointed.").
52 See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir.
1997) ("Given the
pragmatic 'actual performance' test adopted in Leroux, the ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law
made by the bankruptcy court below did not constitute error."); In re Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at
612 ("According to Summit, therefore, the contract rights held by Leroux and Curran terminate without
regard to whether they ever contemplated assigning their 'management' or 'participation' rights under the
Agreement. We cannot agree with its interpretation, for several reasons."); In re Siegal, 190 B.R. at 646
("[Tihis Court is persuaded that Section 365(e)(2) permits state law mandated dissolution to occur only when
actual substituted performance is contemplated."); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 938
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that the reasoning set forth in In re CardinalIndustries was persuasive,
namely "[b]ecause assumption by a trustee on behalf of the estate results in the debtor's performance of the
contract in a Chapter 11 case, invalidation of ipso facto clauses should be the rule, however, either under
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) or by application of the Supremacy Clause ....); In re Cardinal Indus. Inc., 116 B.R.
964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) ("[A]ssumption of the contracts by the Trustee on behalf of the estate with
performance by the Debtor would not constitute an assignment within the meaning intended by
§ 365(c)(1)(A) or § 365(e)(2)(A).").
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section 365(e)(2).
The application and consequences of the hypothetical and actual tests under
section 365(e)(2) is effectively illustrated in the context of state partnership statutes
and partnership agreements. As previously discussed, the Uniform Partnership Acts
restrict the assignment of a partner's full or entire partnership interest. In this
respect, nonbankruptcy law excuses the nondebtor party from accepting
performance from, or rendering performance to, a third party. On this basis, some
courts have concluded that an ipso facto provision in a partnership agreement is
valid in bankruptcy (or is not invalidated by section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code).253
For example, in Catron, a partner in the Orchard Square Partnership, a
partnership formed for the purpose of constructing and managing a shopping center,
filed a bankruptcy case after failing to satisfy two capital calls required by the terms
of the partnership agreement.2 54 After the debtor filed its bankruptcy case and
before the debtor sought to assume his partnership interest, the nondebtor partners
sought relief from the automatic stay in order to exercise a buyout option contained
in the partnership agreement that gave the nondebtor partners the right to buy out
the bankrupt partner in the event that a partner filed a bankruptcy case.255 The
bankruptcy court first concluded that the partnership agreement was "essentially a
personal services contract" that could not be assumed under section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code 256 because "[f]undamentally a partnership is based upon the
253 See In re Catron, 158 B.R. at 639 (finding that an ipso facto clause was not invalidated by section

365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code where section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code barred assumption of the
partnership agreement); In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. at 713 ("Section 365(c) prevents the Debtor-inPossession from assuming or assigning the partnership other than such assignment as allowed by the Idaho
Uniform Partnership Law. Therefore, section 365(e) does not apply to the partnership agreement ....); see
also In re Morgan Sangamon P'ship, 269 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (reasoning that under the
Uniform Partnership Act general partner can not be compelled, without consent, to accept new partner and,
therefore,
ipsofacto clauses in partnership agreements are enforceable).
254
Inre Catron, 158 B.R. at 631:
To meet the partnership's financial obligations, [the managing general partner] made
two capital calls on the partners, one in 1990 and the other in 1991. On both occasions,
Catron did not contribute his share as required by the Partnership Agreement. On
October 17, 1991, Catron filed a petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.
Id.

255 Id. at 626:

Article 16 entitled "Continuation of the Partnership in Certain Events" provides that
upon the bankruptcy of a partner, the partnership is to continue without the winding up
of the partnership's affairs; the bankruptcy of a partner will trigger an option by the
remaining partners to purchase that partner's interest for the fair market value of
partnership assets as established by an independent appraiser.
Id.2 5 6

Id. at 628:

I find that Catron as debtor in possession is a separate entity from Catron as the
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personal trust and confidence of the partners., 25 7 For the same reasons, the
bankruptcy court also concluded that the buyout option that was triggered by the
debtor's bankruptcy was not invalidated by section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code, but rather was validated by section 365(e)(2).25 8 Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court granted the nondebtor parties' motion for relief from the automatic stay, 259 and
the debtor appealed.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to lift the automatic
stay. After concluding that sections 365(c)(1) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code
simply cannot be reconciled, the district court adopted the hypothetical test set forth
by the Third Circuit in West Electronics.260 Since the debtor could not assume the

contract under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the district court also
found that the buyout option that was triggered by the debtor's bankruptcy was not
invalidated by section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the district
court: "[T]he language of the § 365(e)(2)(A)(i) exception tracks almost verbatim the
language found in § 365(c)(1)(A). For this reason, the analysis used to dispose of

appellant's arguments with respect to § 365(c) applies with equal force to appellant's
§ 365(e) argument.,

26 1

On this basis, the district court affirmed the decision to lift

the automatic stay.
In contrast, courts that have determined that section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code creates an actual test have invalidated ipso facto clauses in
partnership agreements under section 365(e)(1). 262 For example, in Summit
prepetition partner. Furthermore, since the partnership agreement is essentially a
personal services contract I am persuaded that § 365(c)(1), in conjunction with other
applicable law, prevents the debtor from assuming the partnership agreement over the
objection of the nondebtor partners.
Id. Since the partnership was created pursuant to Virginia law, the bankruptcy court looked to the Uniform
Partnership Act as adopted by the State of Virginia in order to determine whether applicable law would
excuse the nondebtor parties from exception performance from a party other than Catron. Id.
257 Id. at 627 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 50-21 (Michie 1989), UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404, U.L.A. (1992), and
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990)).
258 Id. at 629 ("[Section] 365(e)(2)(A) provides that in certain circumstances § 365(e)(1) will not apply. I
find for the reasons expressed above that the conditions triggering § 365(e)(2)(A) exist in this case;
therefore, the purchase option in this case will not be invalidated.").
259 See id. at 640 (finding "the burden left upon the remaining partners sufficiently establishes cause under
§ 365(d)(1) for lifting the automatic stay.").
260 See id. at 638 (affirming "the bankruptcy court's conclusion of law that the Partnership Agreement
was
the 'type' of executory contract that § 365(c)(1) barred Catron as a debtor in possession from assuming.")
(emphasis added).
26 Id. at 639.
262 See, e.g., Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 614 (1st Cir.
1995) (holding
"section 365(e) ... preempts enforcement of the ipso facto termination provisions in Section 7.5E of the
[Partnership] Agreement."); Calvin v. Siegal (In re Siegal), 190 B.R. 639, 646 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996)
(ordering "[s]ection 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts the Arizona U[niform] P[artnership]
A[greement]."); Weaver v. Nizny (In re Nizny), 175 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (declaring
"upon the filing of a partner's chapter 11 petition in reorganization § 365(e)(1) prevents an ipso facto
dissolution of a partnership under state law."); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 981-82 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1990) (deciding section 365(e)(1) invalidated ipsofacto clause because section 365(c)(1) did not
prohibit assumption of partnership agreement).
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Investment, two general partners in the Belle Isle Limited Partnership, a limited
partnership formed pursuant to Massachusetts law, filed cases under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.263 After the debtors filed their bankruptcy cases and before
the debtors sought to assume their partnership interests, the nondebtor partners
sought injunctive and declaratory relief to remove the debtors as general partners
pursuant to a provision in the partnership agreement. Under the partnership
agreement, a general partner ceased to be a general partner if it filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy. 264 The bankruptcy court, however, found the provision
unenforceable under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy court first held that section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
did not apply or would not apply in the event that the debtors sought to assume their
interests because "the non-debtor parties would be dealing with the same persons
with whom they had originally contracted., 265 For the same reason, the bankruptcy
court also found that the ipso facto provision triggered by the debtors' bankruptcy
was invalidated by section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, as the
section 365(e)(2)(A) exception was inapplicable. According to the bankruptcy
court: "The language of § 365(e)(2)(A) mirrors, in all significant respects, the
language found in § 365(c). For the reasons stated above with regard to § 365(c),
the Court finds the § 365(e)(2)(A) exception inapplicable in the instant case."266
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court denied the nondebtor parties' motion for
injunctive and declaratory relief, and the nondebtor parties appealed.
The district court and the First Circuit both affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision. The First Circuit rejected the hypothetical test and adopted the actual test,
whereby assumption is not precluded by section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
when the identity of the contracting party remains unchanged.26 7 The First Circuit
observed that the legislative history of the Technical Amendments Act of 1980 is
not directly applicable to the conflict between sections 365(e)(1) and 365(e)(2) of
263 Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 609 (describing background of bankruptcy filing by two of three
partners in Belle Isle Limited Partnership).
264 Id. at 609 n.2 (defining pertinent part of MLPA § 23(4)):

Except as approved by the specific written consent of all partners at the time, a person
ceases to be a general partner of a limited partnership upon the happening of any of the
following events: ... (4)Unless otherwise provided in writing in the partnership
agreement the general partner ... (ii) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; (iii) is
adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent; [or] (iv)files a petition or answer seeking for
himself any reorganization ... or similar relief under any statute, law or regulation ....
Id.
265

Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux (In re LeRoux), 167 B.R. 318, 321 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), affid,

69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining "Curranand LeRoux's status as debtors in possession exempts them
from the restrictions of [section 365(c)(1)]. A debtor in possession can assume and perform a personal
service contract notwithstanding that such contract is otherwise barred from assumption and assignment by a
trustee under applicable law.").
266 In re LeRoux, 167 B.R. at 322 (paralleling section 365(e)(2)(A) analysis with section 365(c) analysis).
267 Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613 ("[S]ection 365(c)[1] presents no bar to [the] assumption of
the Agreement.").
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the Bankruptcy Code because the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984 did not make any changes to the language of section 365(e)(2)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 26' Given the interrelated concerns addressed by
sections 365(c)(1) and 365(e)(2), however, the First Circuit found that "Congress
contemplated in 1984 that section 365(e)(2) would permit a debtor or a debtor in
possession to avoid automatic termination of his executory contract rights under the
section 365(e)(2)(A) exemption. ' 269 Accordingly, the First Circuit adopted
the
27
actual test and found the ipsofacto clause invalid under section 365(e)(1). 1
The extent to which a court will enforce an ipso facto provision under
section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code largely depends upon whether the court
would permit the debtor to assume the contract notwithstanding the existence of
applicable nonbankruptcy law restricting the assignment of the contract. If a
nondebtor is confident that binding precedent requires the application of the
hypothetical test under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, then the
nondebtor also should be fairly confident that an ipsofacto clause in the contract in
question will be given effect under section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. This
conclusion, however, does not relieve the nondebtor of its obligation to seek relief
from the automatic stay because
even the enforcement of a valid ipso facto clause
271
generally requires such relief.
V. PRACTICE TIPS RELATING TO
SECTION 365(c)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Given the importance that a particular contract or lease may have to a debtor's
or a nondebtor party's business, it is crucial for parties to consider the implications
and consequences of section 165(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code early in the
process-perhaps even as early as the initial negotiating and drafting stage of the
contractual relationship. Depending upon the particular party's perspective and
268

Id. (recognizing implications of legislative history by noting "Congress inexplicably chose, in 1984, not

to alter the corresponding language in section 365(e)(2)(A)."); see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.07[2],
at 69 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Rev. 1997) ("[W]hen the language of section 365(c) was
amended to describe contracts under which the other party would not be required to accept performance
from an entity other than 'the debtor or the debtor in possession,' section 365(e)(2) was not similarly
amended.").
269 Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 613.
270 Id. at 614 ("[W]e hold that section 365(e), in the circumstances of this case, preempts enforcement of
the ipsofacto termination provisions in Section 7.5E of the Agreement and in MLPA section 23(4).").
271 See, e.g., Computer Communications v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communications, Inc.),
824 F.2d
725, 730 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e hold that even if § 365(e)(2) allowed Codex to terminate the contract, § 362
automatically stayed termination."); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms
Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) ("Having accepted Merchants 365(e) argument, the Court
must nonetheless reject its contention that right of termination necessarily propels cancellation of the
bonding agreement outside the orbit of the automatic stay."); see also Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (In re Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(agreeing with Computer Communications and Wegner holdings, finding "Ohio Casualty may not terminate
the surety bond without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay," and concluding section 365(e)(2) does
not exempt non-assumable executory contracts from scope of automatic stay).
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goals, as well as the nature of the relationship, this may mean requesting or resisting
language in a contract or lease reflecting the personal nature of the contract or
specifically acknowledging that the contract or lease is subject to section 365(c)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code. If a potential debtor cannot successfully resist this type of
language, this also may mean a request by the potential debtor to include an
acknowledgment in the contract or lease that the nondebtor contract party expressly
consents to the assumption of the contract by the potential debtor in any bankruptcy
or insolvency proceeding. These and a few additional tips for mitigating the effects
of, or utilizing, section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code are set forth below.
A. Tips for PotentialDebtors
Perhaps the most important tip for a potential debtor is to be proactive regarding
any issues relating to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, any
entity considering filing for bankruptcy protection should, prior to making such
decision, take an inventory of, and evaluate, its material executory contracts and
unexpired leases.
Through this review process, a potential debtor should
(1) identify any material executory contracts or unexpired leases that arguably
qualify as section 365(c)(1) contracts and (2) develop a game plan for addressing
these contracts and leases. Depending upon, among other things, the importance of
the contract or lease and the relationship between the contracting parties, a potential
debtor's game plan may vary. For example, if the potential debtor's business hinges
on the continued performance of the particular contract or lease, the debtor may
chose to be proactive with the nondebtor contract party. Proactive steps may
include: (1) executing a confidentiality agreement with the nondebtor contract party
(if the contract or lease itself does not contain a satisfactory confidentiality
provision); (2) explaining the debtor's potential need to file a bankruptcy case;
(3) outlining the debtor's intentions with respect to the particular contract or lease in
any such bankruptcy case; and (4) requesting the nondebtor contract party's consent
to the assumption or assumption and assignment of the contract or lease in any such
bankruptcy case.17 2 The nondebtor contract party most likely will want something in
exchange for any pre-bankruptcy consent, and it may be easier to obtain consent
only to assumption, rather than to assumption and assignment, of the contract or
lease. 273 Nevertheless, if the potential debtor truly is dealing with a contract or lease
272 At

least two courts have held that such consent in the contract or lease itself prohibits the nondebtor

contract party from later using section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to block a debtor's assumption or
assignment of the contract or lease. See Metro. Airports Comm'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (In re Midway
Airlines, Inc.), 6 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding contract provision, in light of section 365,
allowing lease to be assigned if Midway enters bankruptcy); In re Supernatural Foods, L.L.C., 268 B.R. 759,
804 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (finding section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code inapplicable where license
agreement permitted assignment incident to liquidation or sale of substantially all of debtor's assets); see also
In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating language of agreement is relevant to whether
section 365(c)(1) of Bankruptcy Code precludes debtor from assuming and assigning agreement).
273 One such request may be an acknowledgment in the contract or lease that the debtor will assume
the
contract or lease in any bankruptcy case. As a general rule, however, prebankruptcy waivers of bankruptcy
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critical to its business operations, this pre-bankruptcy negotiation and agreement
may be an extremely worthwhile exercise.
If, on the other hand, the contracts or leases arguably subject to
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code are not critical to the debtor's business
operations or the relationship between the contracting parties makes it difficult to
approach the nondebtor party prior to any bankruptcy filing, the potential debtor's
game plan should include a thorough legal evaluation of these contracts or leases so
that the debtor is prepared for (and not surprised by) any issues relating to
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code raised in the bankruptcy case. For
example, if a potential debtor is contemplating a straight reorganization under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and does not anticipate a sale of assets,
determining that the debtor is filing in a jurisdiction applying the actual test (as
opposed to the hypothetical test) under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
may give the debtor sufficient comfort.274 Likewise, determining that the debtor has
arguments against the characterization of the particular contracts or leases as
nondelegable or nonassignable under "applicable law" (as that phrase is used in
section 365(c)(1) and interpreted in the particular filing jurisdiction) may arm the
debtor with sufficient ammufiition to eliminate or at least mitigate any concerns
relating to section 365(c)(1). 275 A contract or lease arguably is subject to
rights are unenforceable. See Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 652 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998)
("[C]ourts have held that prepetition waivers of other bankruptcy benefits are also enforceable."); Fallick v.
Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating in dictum advance agreements to waive benefits of
bankruptcy are void); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (finding
debtor's pre-petition agreement not to reject or to assume executory contract violates public policy for
binding debtors in possession without regard to third parties and bankruptcy estate); In re Am. Sweeteners,
Inc., 248 B.R. 271, 276 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) ("I note that many courts have held that prepetition a
debtor cannot waive the rights bestowed upon it by the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Heward Bros., 210 B.R.
475, 479 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997) ("Generally, a prepetition agreement to waive a benefit of bankruptcy is
void as against public policy."); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("[B]efore the
bankruptcy case is filed, the debtor does not have the capacity to waive the rights bestowed by the
Bankruptcy Code upon a Chapter 11 debtor in possession."); In re Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R.
486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) ("It is a well settled principal that an advance agreement to waive the
benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public policy."). But see, e.g.,
In re S.E.
Fin. Assocs., 212 B.R. 1003, 1005 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) ("A prepetition waiver of bankruptcy benefits
may be binding unless the agreement was obtained by coercion, fraud or mutual mistake of material fact.");
In re Atrium High Point Ltd. P'ship, 189 B.R. 599, 607 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) ("[T]his court elieves that
such prepetition waivers enforceable in appropriate cases."); In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 483 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1994) ("I agree that pre-petition agreements waiving opposition to relief from the automatic stay may
be enforceable in appropriate cases."); In re Citadel Props., Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)
(enforcing settlement agreement entered into pre-petition which gave creditor immediate relief from
automatic stay if debtor filed for bankruptcy). In addition, debtors generally resist such requests in order to
maintain maximum flexibility regarding the treatment of their contracts and leases in any bankruptcy case.
Alternatively, the nondebtor party may request substantive changes to the contract terms-particularly,
payment or default terms (e.g., cash in advance, shortened grace periods upon default, right to suspend
performance or to terminate upon default, etc.)-to obtain additional protection in any bankruptcy case.
274See cases cited supra note 196.
275 For example, as discussed in Sections III.B.4 and III.B.5 above, neither the Anti-Assignment Act nor
state laws that restrict the ability of a franchisee to assign a franchise or interest therein are based upon the
"personal" nature of the contract or the materiality of the identity of the performing party. Accordingly, in
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section 365(c)(1) only if the debtor otherwise seeks to assume or assume and assign
the contract or lease under sections 365(a) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code or if
the nondebtor contract party seeks to force rejection of the contract or lease under
section 365(c)( 1).276
In addition, a startup entity or any entity that anticipates future financial issues
should be diligent in the negotiation and drafting of any new (or amendments to
existing) material contracts or leases. Particularly in the context of intellectual
property licenses, it is not uncommon for a party to request language in the contract
acknowledging that the contract is "personal" in nature, dependent upon the identity
of the contracting parties or, even more directly, subject to section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
More subtle language requests intended to address
section 365(c)(1) may include a reference to a particular federal or state law
intended to govern the contract or lease, which law arguably draws the contract or
lease under section 365(c)(1). If the potential debtor does not have a concern
regarding the other party's financial condition,2 77 the potential debtor should resist
this type of language or, at a minimum, request the other party's consent to the
assumption of the contract or lease by the debtor itself and, perhaps, even the
assumption and assignment of the contract or lease to a third party. In addition, if
the contract or lease is not or is not intended by the parties to be personal in nature,
the potential debtor should include language in the contract reflecting this reality.
For example, the contract should contain objective performance targets and
expressly provide (in the recitals or covenants) that the contract is a standard supply
contract for widgets and that, if the potential debtor is unable to perform, it may
substitute the performance of another widget supplier, delegate its obligations or
otherwise assign the contract.278
Finally, if appropriate, based upon the nature of the contract or lease, a potential
debtor could seek to take a security interest in the subject matter of the contract or
lease. 279 This security interest should be established to secure the other party's
jurisdictions that consider whether the identity of the performing party is material in determining whether
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code applies, a debtor may have arguments against the characterization
of, at least, government contracts and franchise agreements as being subject to section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
276 As discussed above in Section V.A, the debtor in Valley Media was permitted to retain its rights under
distribution agreements during the pendency of the bankruptcy even though the debtor could not assume or
assume and assign the distribution agreements.
277If the potential debtor does have concerns regarding the other party's financial condition and desires to
protect its section 365(c)(1) rights in any bankruptcy of such party, the potential debtor should consider
negotiating a mutual version of the contract provisions suggested below for nondebtor contract parties.
See infra text accompanying note 279 (offering ways nondebtor parties can protect interests when
contracting with entities in precarious financial situations).
278See infra text accompanying note 279 (noting, after suggesting ways nondebtor can protect its interests,
courts may decline to give weight to contract language).
279This strategy may be particularly effective in the context of intellectual property licenses. For a general
discussion of the mechanics for taking a security interest in intellectual property subject to a license
agreement and some related issues, see generally Cieri & Morgan, supra note 99, at 1691-97 (reviewing
ways to enhance leverage in bankruptcy, to structure security agreements, to draft covenants and to perfect
security interests). In addition, rather than taking a security interest in the subject matter of the contract or

HeinOnline -- 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 256 2005

2005]

DEBTORS BEWARE

performance under the contract or lease, and the potential debtor should obtain
rights to exercise and foreclose on the security interest in the event that, among
other things, the nondebtor party refuses performance, including through the
unreasonable withholding of consent to any continued performance by the debtor
(and potentially the assignment by the debtor to a third party). This, of course, may
be the most challenging provision for a potential debtor to negotiate; however, if
obtained, it may act as an effective deterrent to the nondebtor contract party raising
any issues relating to section 365(c)(1) in any subsequent bankruptcy case because
the nondebtor contract party may risk losing all of its rights in the subject matter of
the contract or lease.
B. Tips for Nondebtor ContractParties
Similar to the discussion above for a potential debtor, nondebtor parties that are
party to (or considering becoming party to) contracts with financially troubled
entities (i.e., potential debtors) should be proactive in the protection and utilization
of their rights under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, prior
to a bankruptcy filing, nondebtor parties should carefully consider the language of
their contracts and, if the contract is or is intended by the parties to be personal in
nature, the contract language should reflect this reality. For example, the contract
should describe (in the recitals or covenants) the subjective factors considered by
the parties in entering into the agreement (e.g., the particular qualifications of the
potential debtor, the nondebtor party's reliance on the potential debtor's
qualifications, the nondebtor party's need for a specialized service or widget and the
potential debtor's unique ability to provide such service or widget, etc.) and
expressly provide that the potential debtor may not substitute the services or product
of a third party and, of course, may not assign or delegate its obligations under the
contract to a third party. There is no "magic" language in this context, and a
bankruptcy court, being a court of equity, may decline to give substantial weight to
the contract language (for example, finding such language to be an impermissible
prebankruptcy waiver or as elevating form over substance).28 ° If nothing else,
however, tailoring the language of the contract to reflect the true nature of the
contractual relationship may assist the nondebtor party in satisfying its evidentiary
burden at any hearing before the bankruptcy court or, at least, enhance the
nondebtor party's leverage in any negotiations with the debtor (or its creditors'
committee) regarding treatment of the contract or lease in the bankruptcy.
In addition, the contract or lease should give the nondebtor party the specific
right to terminate the contract or lease upon the filing of a voluntary or involuntary
lease, the potential debtor could attempt to secure the nondebtor party's continued performance and/or
consent through a guarantee or letter of credit. As with the grant of a security interest, the potential debtor
must be careful in drafting the events triggering its collection rights under any guarantee or letter of credit,
and such events should include a refusal by the nondebtor party to consent or perform under the contract or
lease.
280 See general discussion and cases cited supra note 273.
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bankruptcy by or against the potential debtor, the insolvency of the potential debtor
or any other material adverse change with respect to the potential debtor's financial
condition. As discussed above, these "ipsofacto" clauses generally are enforceable
if the contract or lease is subject to section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 28 '
Moreover, the nondebtor party may want to include financial reporting or notice
provisions in the contract or lease, which would require the potential debtor to
provide the nondebtor party with periodic financial reports or notice of any material
adverse change, such as a bankruptcy filing. These types of provisions will allow
the nondebtor party to monitor the potential debtor's financial condition and take
immediate action when necessary or appropriate.
Once a bankruptcy case is filed by or against the potential debtor, the nondebtor
party should be proactive in the enforcement of its rights under the contract or lease
and sections 365(c)(1) and 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, if the
nondebtor party desires to terminate the contract or lease because of the bankruptcy
filing (and based upon an ipso facto clause in the contract or lease), the nondebtor
party should file a motion for relief from the automatic stay to exercise its rights
under section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as soon as it receives notice of the
bankruptcy filing.28 2 Any delay in taking such action may be argued as a waiver or
estoppel by the debtor, since the termination right arguably is linked to the filing of
the bankruptcy case itself. Likewise, if the nondebtor party elects not to terminate
the contract or lease immediately upon the bankruptcy filing, it should stay apprised
of events in the bankruptcy case to ensure that the debtor does not seek to assume or
assume and assign the contract or lease pursuant to sections 365(a) and 365(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Absent a timely objection to any such treatment by the
nondebtor party under section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
court may enter an order authorizing the assumption or assumption and assignment
of the contract or lease.
Finally, the nondebtor party should resist any attempt by the debtor to take a
security interest in the subject matter of the contract or lease, to obtain consent to
the assignment (even limited assignment) of the contract or lease and, depending
upon the goals of the nondebtor .party, perhaps even to obtain consent to the
283
assumption or continued performance of the contract or lease by the debtor itself.

As discussed above, these types of contract provisions may eliminate or restrict the
nondebtor party's rights under section 365(c)(1) (and, in turn, section 365(e)(2)) of
the Bankruptcy Code.
CONCLUSION
Although not a new provision in the Bankruptcy Code, the impact of
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly is gaining momentum vis-A-vis
281See supra Section 1V.B.
282 See supra Section W.A.
283See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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protection of nondebtor contract parties, and the expanding application of the
section therefore may have unexpected and adverse consequences for debtors.
Accordingly, contracting parties need to be aware of the current scope and
application of section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and to plan accordingly. In
fact, the best advice for either the potential debtor or the nondebtor contract party is
to be proactive-make sure you understand your rights under section 365(c)(1) (and
section 365(e)(2)) of the Bankruptcy Code and take timely steps to protect those
rights.
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